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BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
THE MORALIST AS EXPERT WITNESSt
By RICHARD DELGADO* AND PETER MCALLEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually all modern legal theorists believe that law and morality interpen-
etrate in the areas of constitutional and appellate decisionmaking. 1 Yet trial
t © 1982 by Richard Delgado and Peter McAllen.
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havioral Research.
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, J.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1981.
See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1977)
("[I]t is only after resolving certain philosophical issues that one can make sense of
the constitutional question .... "); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 109
(1962) (Supreme Court is "charged with the evolution and application of society's
fundamental principles.") [hereinafter cited as A. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH]; A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 87 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT]; LORD DEVLIN, THE EN-
FORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49,
184, 207, 240 (1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); C. FRIED, AN
ANATOMY OF VALUES (1970); H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 151-207 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as H. HART, CONCEPT]; H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY
(1963) [hereinafter cited as H. HART, LAW]; J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46-53
(1971); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND
POLITICS (1975); Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE
L.J. 986 (1966); Fallon, To Each According to His Ability, From None According to
His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law of Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U.L. REV.
815, 820 (1980). Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS
182 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in
the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (1975); Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Michelman, Property,
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensa-
tion" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
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courts, too, must reason normatively. 2 Even when a case is "governed by a
rule," a trial judge must necessarily supplement linguistic interpretation of
the rule with moral intuitions about justice, fairness, and rightness.' The need
for supplementation is particularly acute in cases of first impression, con-
troversies requiring an unusual or unanticipated application of a preexisting
rule to a factual setting, and litigation under a statute or rule requiring a
discretionary judgment concerning the best interest of a child or an incompe-
tent person. 4 Without careful analysis, however, "[i]t is unclear how (ethical
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 664 (1960); Morris, Persons and Punishment,
52 MONIST 475 (1968); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974).
Some would afford a broader, or narrower, scope for judicial valuation, see, e.g.,
J. ELy, supra (judiciary should determine process, rather than substantive, values);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959) (similar argument), but all agree that the appellate process requires at least
some normative reasoning by courts, see Yesley, The Ethics Advisory Board & the
Right to Know, 10 HASTINGS CENT. REP., Oct. 1980, at 5, 6-7 (describing the range of
ways in which law and morals might overlap: (1) law forecloses moral inquiry; (2)
law establishes bounds within which ethical inquiry may proceed; (3) moral analysis
reveals need for legal change; (4) metaethical analysis may reveal that a dilemma is
not resolvable by legal or moral arguments); see also Carter, When Courts Should
Make Policy: An Institutional Approach, in PUBLIC LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
(J. Gardiner ed. 1977) (offering guidelines to help decide when judicial policymaking
is permissible). Of course, the Constitution itself mandates protection of the substan-
tive norms and values incorporated in the Bill of Rights. See R. DWORKIN, supra, at
180 (The "Constitution fuses legal and moral issues, by making the validity of a law
depend on the answer to complex moral problems."); Sandalow, Judicial Protection
of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1184 (1977) ("[Clonstitutional law must ... be
understood as the means by which effect is given to those ideas that ... are held to be
fundamental in defining the limits and distribution of government power in our
society.").
2 See, e.g., R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION (1970); Moore, The
Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 293-94 (1981) (rejecting as conceptu-
ally impossible the extreme formalist view that judges merely apply legislative or
common law rules to the case before them); see also B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921) (judges "fill the open spaces in the law"); Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958);
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908); cf. Yesley, The Use of an Advisory
Commission, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1452 (1979) (advocating use of ethics advisory
panels to achieve consensus in areas of "sharply conflicting values"). But see
R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS 175 (1975); Zane, Ger-
man Legal Philosophy, 16 MICH. L. REV. 287, 338 (1918) ("Every judicial act [is] a
pure deduction.").
3 Moore, supra ncte 2, at 293-94.
4 See infra Section V (discussing the use of expert witnesses by trial courts to
supply normative value analysis).
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and jurisprudential) issues like these are to be resolved; certainly they lie
beyond the ordinary techniques of the practicing lawyers." '
Faced with issues that require moral decisionmaking, trial courts some-
times receive expert testimony from moral, ethical, and religious au-
thorities. 6 Such testimony can take three basic forms. The first, "descriptive
"Supplementation" is also inevitable in constitutional litigation involving "funda-
mental" interests. Courts sometimes make value judgments when plaintiffs seek to
establish previously unrecognized fundamental rights, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (recognizing privacy as a fundamental right); Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494, 502-12 (Alaska 1975) (in-home possession of marijuana by adults
for personal use protected by Federal and Alaska constitutional right of privacy;
however, possession or ingestion of marijuana are not fundamental rights in and of
themselves), and necessarily engage in normative analysis when they balance com-
peting "rights" or moral principles, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-49
(1976) (balancing plaintiff's need for disability benefits, discounted by probable
sufficiency of existing procedures, against fiscal and administrative burdens asso-
ciated with an evidentiary hearing); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973)
(identifying the point at which the state's interest in protecting health and the
potentiality for human life becomes sufficiently compelling to override privacy con-
cerns); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (finding "conduct that shocks
the conscience" after engaging in a "disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of
science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated"). Questions concern-
ing the proper role of the courts in this area are beyond the scope of this Article.
Compare A. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 1, at 109; L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 452 (1978); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 227 (1980) and Sandalow, Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1069 (1981) (courts should select
and protect values in accordance with current conceptions of political morality), with
J. ELY, supra note 1 passim and Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 353, 392-95 (1981) (courts, limited by original intent and precedent, should
prescribe only process-related values).
5 R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 1.
6 See infra notes 10, 12 & 21-63 and cases discussed therein.
Evidentiary rules in every jurisdiction permit counsel, and judges acting on their
own initiative, to call expert witnesses. See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 4-32 (2d ed. 1972); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 555-71 (J. Chadbourne rev. ed. 1979); Ladd, Expert
Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 416-21 (1952). Under these rules, qualified experts
have testified on diverse subjects lying beyond the average person's ken, including
ballistics, Evans v. Commonwealth, 230 Ky. 411, 417-29, 19 S.W.2d 1091, 1094-99
(1929); manufacturing defects in metal casings, Wylie v. Ford Motor Co., 502 F.2d
1292, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 1974); insanity, State v. Eggleston, 161 Wash. 486, 297 P. 162
(1931); see also Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as Expert Witness, 63 MiCH.
L. REV. 1335 (1965) (noting limitations of expert testimony on issues of mental health
science); the standard of care for medical malpractice, Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406,
432 P.2d 250 (1967); the monetary worth of a homemaker's services, Har-Pen Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705, 711-12 (5th Cir. 1967); and foreign law, e.g.,
Murphy v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 111 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 203 F.2d
19821
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ethics," entails informing the court about the beliefs that persons or groups
actually hold. 7 Moralists also testify in a "metaethical" mode by aiding
courts in analyzing complex concepts or arguments. 8 The moralist's most
problematic function, however, consists of giving testimony on matters of
"normative" ethics in cases of first impression. 9 Moralists providing such
testimony purport to help courts make difficult moral choices by offering
unadorned edicts on the goodness or badness of persons, acts, or rules of
law. 10
645 (2d Cir. 1953); see also 2 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 564 (describing standards for the
admission of expert testimony on questions of foreign law in the United States and
elsewhere). No court, however, has yet addressed the evidentiary or policy issues
raised by the use of a moralist as an expert witness.
7 For a discussion of the moralist's descriptive function, see infra notes 18-35 and
accompanying text.
For a discussion of the moralist's metaethical role, see infra notes 36-43 and
accompanying text.
9 For a discussion of the moralist's normative role, see infra notes 44-63 and
accompanying text.
10 A number of these questions have arisen in connection with biomedical
technologies. E.g., Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct.
1972) (discussed infra at notes 52-60 and accompanying text); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); see also
T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (1979);
T. BEAUCHAMP & L. WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS (1978);
G. KEIFFER, BIOETHICS: A TEXTBOOK OF ISSUES (1979).
Saikewi'icz provides a useful illustration. In that case, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court considered the state's obligation to treat, over his incompetent protest,
a severely retarded adult inmate afflicted with fatal leukemia. Chemotherapy might
have prolonged the patient's life, but only at the price of pain and increased sickness.
Without treatment, death would come swiftly and relatively painlessly. At issue was
the moral standing of an incompetent, moribund patient to choose the latter alterna-
tive.
In resolving this question, the court initially determined that the case was one of
first impression. 373 Mass. at 747, 370 N.E.2d at 428. It then noted that the law often
lags behind the most advanced thinking of "theologians and moral leaders," and
sought guidance from "the framework of medical ethics which influence a doctor's
decision," recognizing that such considerations were not controlling but "ought to be
considered for the insights they give us." Id. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 423. The court
found that medical ethicists no longer believe that doctors should invariably prolong
life by extraordinary means, id. at 738, 370 N.E.2d at 424, and that maintaining the
ethical integrity of the medical profession was a cognizable state interest, id. at
741-45, 370 N.E.2d at 425-27. It consequently declined to order treatment. Id. at 759,
r/0 N.E.2d at 435.
In cases of this nature, the need for normative analysis is acute, since inaction
merely resolves an ethical dilemma in favor of one outcome over another; a child
dies, a moribund patient remains connected to life-support machinery for perhaps an
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The use of moral experts by trial courts raises a number of vexing eviden-
tiary and jurisprudential issues." Can any type of testimony by a moral
expert improve judicial decisionmaking, and if so, how? Does moral exper-
tise, in fact, exist? If so, what forms does it take, who possesses it, and when
can it be imparted in court without contravening the fundamental premises
of our legal system? A few courts have implicitly recognized some of these
difficulties and have rejected certain types of expert moral testimony.'
2
indefinite period. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 4-5. Yet few writers have
considered the process by which trial courts should make such value decisions. Cf.
Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975) (legal
decision-making procedures should accommodate substantive concerns at stake).
I In appellate practice, attorneys for parties and amici curiae often analyze
societal values in the course of making policy-based arguments. See infra note 125
and accompanying text. This is a time-honored function which presents few, if any,
evidentiary problems. An appellate advocate arguing morals or public policy makes
no claim of expertise or impartiality and cannot excessively sway a jury. CJ infra
notes 110-36 and accompanying text (discussing potential obstacles to the use of
expert moralists by trial courts).
In light of these considerations, appellate courts are unlikely to call upon expert
moralists. Dilemmas are apt to lack the immediacy and poignancy at this level that
they often have at the trial court level, and the need for an expert is apt to be less
strongly felt. Cf. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972)
(kidney transplant case requiring trial court to make an immediate life-or-death
decision). Moreover, the likelihood that an advocate would consider ceding some of
his or her limited time for oral argument to an expert witness of any sort seems
remote, even if the rules of appellate practice permitted such testimony.
12 E.g., United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1972) (upholding
exclusion of testimony by moralists concerning moral status of defendant's beliefs
and of the Vietnam war on the ground that justification was not a defense to a charge
of draft disruption); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1326-27 (D.N.J. 1977) (on
question of whether particular teachings were religious under the establishment
clause, the court would be governed by prior judicial findings, and the testimony of
experts on religion would not be helpful), aff'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979); see
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (complaining of
expert witnesses who in reality issue "ethical and legal conclusions ... in a domain
that is properly not theirs but the jury's"); Lilly v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 269,
270-71 (4th Cir.) (Courts must decide issues of public policy "and it is immaterial that
the question may be one of ethics rather than of law .... It is the judges themselves
assisted by the bar, who ... represent the highest common factor of public sentiment
and intelligence.") (quoting Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42
HARV. L. REv. 76, 97 (1928) (footnotes omitted)), rev'd, 343 U.S. 90 (1951); see also
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 757-59,
370 N.E.2d 417, 434-35 (1977) (accepting proposition that law must defer to consid-
erations of medical ethics, but refusing to provide for hospital "ethics" committee to
make decisions concerning termination of treatment for dying patients on the ground
that decisions to order treatments are -[the courts'] responsibility ... and not to be
1982]
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Others have regarded the decision to hear expert testimony on moral or
ethical matters as falling within the discretion of the trial court.' 3 Neither
courts nor commentators, however, have addressed systematically the
evidentiary considerations that might argue for or against such testimony, or
examined the larger implications of moral philosophy in the courtroom. 14
This Article explores the various uses of moral experts by trial courts in an
attempt to grapple with those issues. It first describes the potential functions
entrusted to any other group"); cf. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 49-50, 355 A.2d 647,
668-69 (authorizing establishment of a hospital "ethics" committee to consider moral
dilemmas associated with patient care), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
13 See infra notes 18-63 and accompanying text.
14 To the authors' knowledge, the only previous discussion of the moralist's role
as an expert witness at trial is a brief reference in Spece, A Purposive Analysis of
Constitutional Standards of Judicial Review and a Practical Assessment of the
Constitutionality of Regulating Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REv.
1281, 1329-30 (1977). Commentators have noted that ethicists sometimes testify or
present papers before legislative or executive committees. E.g., Yesley, supra note
1, at 6-7 (theologians and ethicists submitted papers and contributed opinions on
ethical aspects of research and human experimentation); Yesley, supra note 2, at
1457-63 (noting the same assistance by theologians and ethicists); Interview with
Richard Wasserstrom, then Professor of Law & Philosophy, U.C.L.A., in
Westwood, California (July 27, 1979) (Wasserstrom, an academic ethicist, supplied
analyses and opinions for the benefit of federal committees in connection with
abortion and fetal experimentation); see also Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 313
(1946) (upholding Selective Service practice of referring certain files to panels of
religious experts since "[w]ise administration may call for the expert advice they
alone can offer"); Sullivan, Hospitals Turn to Philosophers on Life Issues, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 19, 1982, at Al, col. 3 (philosophers with a "deeper insight into the
,meaning of life' and into ... complex and conflicting moral and ethical questions"
used in day-to-day operations of New York teaching hospitals).
Expert testimony on ethical matters before a legislative or executive committee,
however, raises fewer questions than does similar testimony in a court of law. First,
testimony before most legislative and executive bodies, even when sworn, involves
partisan advocacy and differs somewhat from in-court testimony aimed at the
ascertainment of truth. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 245, at 582 (oath of
truth). Second, legislators may invite whomever they wish to testify, but historical
and doctrinal limitations relating to matters such as reliability of the testimony and
the qualifications of the witness circumscribe testimony before a court. See infra
notes 82-86 and accompanying text. Finally, legislative and executive processes
receive greater public scrutiny than does judicial decisionmaking, and are more
readily subject to later amendment. Courts consider themselves bound by the doc-
trine of stare decisis, and as a result, are reluctant to reverse themselves in light of
moral reconsideration. See Parish v. Schwartz, 344 I11. 563, 571-72, 176 N.E. 757, 761
(1931) ("If public policy does require such a change as that insisted upon, the remedy
may be found through application to the legislature."); cf. supra notes 1-2 (discussing
generally the role of moral rights analysis in appellate and constitutional litigation).
[Vol. 62: 869
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served by moral experts, subdividing these functions under the three con-
ceptual headings just noted. Next, it reviews evidentiary rules relating to
expert witnesses, and considers various doctrinal, institutional, and philo-
sophical objections to the use of moral experts at trial. The Article then sets
forth criteria designed to ensure that moral experts actually aid courts in
reaching correct decisions without usurping their ultimate authority to de-
cide controversies, and canvasses the views of leading moral philosophers to
determine which schools of thought could meet the proposed criteria. Based
on this analysis, it appears that moralists should be allowed to testify only in
certain situations. In those situations, however, the moral expert can pro-
vide a service heretofore little recognized by courts.
II. FUNCTIONS OF THE MORALIST AS WITNESS
"Moral testimony" does not concern every form of testimonial assistance
that an individual with specialized ethical training might offer. For example,
the in-court statements of a moralist who witnessed a traffic accident and
testified concerning the details of the crash would constitute ordinary,
nonexpert testimony and would present no special problems. Expert moral
testimony instead concerns trial testimony by a person with a claim of
expertise, on issues of right, wrong, goodness, badness, wisdom, unwisdom,
fairness, and the like, as well as on mixed questions of morals and fact or the
application of moral principles to given facts.
15
Within this broad and general definition of expert moral testimony it is
possible to distinguish three branches of inquiry: descriptive ethics,
metaethics, and normative ethics. 16 Testimony under these various headings
implicates a corresponding variety of evidentiary considerations. As a re-
sult, it can be expected that such testimony will meet different degrees of
resistance by the judicial system. Of course, not all potential functions of
expert moralists fit neatly within this tripartite division; to some extent, the
categories overlap and merge. A question concerning the nature of a per-
son's religious beliefs, for example, could fall under any or all of the three
15 The line between "fact" and "value" is not easy to draw. This Article offers no
such distinction, but includes under the heading "moral testimony" all cases present-
ing mixed questions of morals and fact. See generally Veatch, Hospital Ethics
Committees: Is There a Role?, 7 HASTINGS CENT. REP., June 1977, at 22, 23 ("We
have become increasingly aware of blurring between facts and values. When one is
attempting to make a prognosis involving such vague terms as 'reasonable hope' and
cognitive, sapient state,' questions of value may impinge upon even the determina-
tion of prognosis.").
16 See generally P. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS (1954) (setting out three types of
ethical reasoning as basis for discussion); Nielson, Problems of Ethics, in 3 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 117, 117-21 (P. Edwards ed. 1967) (distinguishing the
three types of philosophical inquiry). We do not limit further the bounds of discourse
properly regarded as moral. Thus, as we use the term, testimony on descriptive
ethics, metaethics, and normative ethics would qualify as "moral" testimony.
1982]
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subheadings depending upon the purpose of the ethicist's response. 17
Nonetheless, the suggested subdivision offers a useful starting point for
illustration and analysis of the ethicist's potential functions.
17 Litigation under the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. I, often illustrates the potential overlap among the categories of ethical
inquiry. For instance, in Theriault v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1977), on
remand, 453 F. Supp. 255 (W.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 579 F.2d 302 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979), federal prison inmates claiming membership
in the "Church of the New Song" sought special privileges to enable the unhindered
practice of their alleged religion-the "Eclatarian Faith." Vacating and remanding an
earlier decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit instructed
the trial court to ascertain whether "Eclatarianism" was a religion within the mean-
ing of the first amendment through a "thorough study of the existing case law...
[and] appropriate evidentiary exploration of philosophical, theological, and other
related literature and resources .... 547 F.2d at 1281. The trial court's resolution of
this issue demonstrates that it considered descriptive, metaethical, and normative
questions relevant to the issue at hand.
On remand, the trial court first found that "[t]he beliefs professed by the petitioner
are not sincerely held .... ." 453 F. Supp. at 264. Although the court might have
rejected the first amendment claim on this basis alone, it also clearly regarded the
finding as relevant in determining whether Eclatarianism itself would qualify as a
religion under the first amendment. On this point, the court was apparently of the
view that " 'so called religions ... whose members are patently devoid of religious
sincerity' " are not religions at all. Id. at 259 (quoting Theriault, 391 F. Supp. at 395).
This would seem a metaethical-or metatheological-position. The court also ex-
pressed the opinion that -[t]he professed views" of the Eclatarian were "more
closely akin to the megalomania of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis or Charles Manson and
his 'family' than any 'belief . . . that occupies a place parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God.' " Id. at 261. This proposition seems to include, tacitly, the
following: a metaethical and theological judgment that religious doctrine is not evil, a
descriptive judgment that the Eclatarian doctrine is like Nazism, and a normative
judgment that Nazism and Eclatarianism are evil. Based on these judgments, the
court emphatically rejected the petitioner's claim. Id. at 265. For another example,
see Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1303-10 (D.N.J. 1977) (testimony concerning
the status of transcendental meditation as a religion under the first amendment),
aff'd, 572 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
Questions of this nature often arose during the Vietnam era whenever persons
sought conscientious objector status under the Universal Military Service and Train-
ing Act, § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1976). That Act grants immunity from
combat training and service in the armed forces for persons whose objections arise
from "religious training and belief" rather than "essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." Id. Thus, a court or draft
board applying the statute would seemingly have to consider the sincerity of potential
inductees' religious beliefs (a question mixing descriptive, metaethical, and norma-
tive elements), the distinctions between "religious" and "merely personal moral
codes" (metaethics), and whether given religions within the meaning of the statute
are "opposed to participation in war in any form" (descriptive ethics). Id.
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A. Descriptive Ethics
Beliefs vary from person to person and culture to culture. Thus, the
moralist's role in many trials is to cast an empirical eye over the field of
morality and describe the normative beliefs held by a person or a society.'
8
A moralist testifying descriptively might inform the court about the morality
or immorality of an act according to the tenets of some ethical, philosoph-
ical, or religious system to which the expert may or may not subscribe. 19
Alternatively, the moralist might testify as to the nature of an act or a
person's "moral standing" according to the mores of a particular commu-
nity. 0 Finally, a moralist testifying descriptively might perform a canvassing
function by identifying the morality or immorality of an act according to the
tenets of some or all ethical, philosophical, or religious systems worthy of
serious consideration, 21 or by informing the court that a particular issue has
11 For example, a carnivore's observation that Hindus think it immoral to eat meat
would represent an exercise in descriptive ethics. Views have differed, however, as
to how sharp a distinction can be drawn between normative and descriptive ethics.
At one extreme, some philosophers have insisted that no number of "merely"
descriptive statements will ever entail a normative conclusion. E.g., R. HARE, THE
LANGUAGE OF MORALS 79-83 (1952); G. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 9-21 (1903);
Hare, Descriptivism, in THE Is-OUGHT QUESTION 240, 240-47 (W. Hudson ed. 1969).
Writers at the other extreme have supposed it possible to draw normative conclu-
sions from descriptive premises, and have argued that doing so is a routine part of
moral reasoning. E.g., Searle, How to Derive an Ought from an Is, 73 PHIL. REV. 43
(1964). For several perspectives on this issue, see THE Is-OUGHT QUESTION, supra.
19 See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text; see also Veatch, Professional
Ethics: New Principles for Physicians?, 10 HASTINGS CENT. REP., June 1980, at 16,
18 (new AMA guidelines place medical ethics within general system of philosophical
ethics); Yesley, supra note 2, at 1466 (National Commission resolved difficult moral
problems by reference to principle of utilitarianism-that we seek the greatest good
of the greatest number).
20 Testimony concerning the obscenity of films or books sometimes combines
normative and descriptive elements. A statement that something is obscene accord-
ing to a community standard is descriptive; a pronouncement that something is
simply "obscene" is normative. Hence, it is crucial to consider the witness's tes-
timonial context and purpose in examining cases of this nature. See United States v.
One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film, 367 F.2d 889, 894-95 (2d Cir. 1966) (one
minister testified that film was "offensive throughout the entire Community"; an-
other maintained that it did not "arous[e] lustful desire"). See generally McGaffly,
A Realistic Look at Expert Witnesses in Obscenity Cases, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 218
(1974) (arguing that both practical experience and communications research support
the conclusion that experts probably have little effect in value-oriented areas such as
obscenity).
21 See United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 703 n.9 (8th Cir. 1972) (citing
views of Socrates, St. Thomas Aquinas, Sir Thomas More, Gandhi, Martin Luther
King, Jr., Bayard Rustin, and the Lutheran and Episcopal Churches in support of the
proposition that justification of civil disobedience depends upon actor's nonviolence
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"no right answer" in light of disagreement among moral systems. 22
A New York case, Friedman v. New York, 23 provides a graphic illustration
of the moralist's descriptive function. In that case, a sixteen-year-old girl
and her male companion became stranded in mid-air when the mountainside
chair-lift in which they were descending closed for the evening without prior
announcement. 24 The girl, reared in an ultra-orthodox Hebrew tradition and
thus believing herself morally compelled not to spend the night alone with a
man, became hysterical and fell to the ground, sustaining facial injuries. 25 In
the girl's subsequent action against the state for negligent operation of the
lift, a rabbi trained in Hebrew law testified that, under the circumstances,
the girl's reaction had been consistent with her religious principles. 26 Based
and acceptance of the consequences for such disobedience); Radin, Cruel Punish-
ment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
1143, 1147 n.11 (1980) (descriptive ethics in debate over death penalty); Yesley,
supra note 2, at 1460 (HEW Ethics Advisory Board (hereinafter Ethics Advisory
Board) decided issues of fetal experimentation by obtaining papers "presenting the
range of philosophical opinion ... and a synthesizing analysis of those papers"); see
also Yesley, supra note 1, at 5 (Information gathering helps sharpen issues, "but
their resolution is still dependent upon the establishment of moral priorities." The
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (hereinafter National Commission), for example, "gathered
substantial evidence on the use of prisoners as research subjects . . . but the
recommendations . . . were primarily a reflection of ethical positions regarding
vulnerable populations." In another instance, the right-to-know issue was analyzed
by comparing outcome under three contemporary schools of moral philosophy).
22 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 131-40 (1973) (reviewing contemporary and histori-
cal attitudes toward abortion); id. at 160-61 (describing conflicting views of various
ethical systems on question of when life begins); Yesley, supra note 1, at 7 (decisions
must be based on practical considerations when abstract moral imperatives fail to
dictate a response). But see Dworkin, No Right Answer, in LAW, MORALITY AND
SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 58 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds.
1977); Rachels, Can Ethics Provide Answers?, 10 HASTINGS CENT. REP., June 1980,
at 32, 34-35 (both discussing and rejecting the view that morality is purely subjective
or simply a system of disguised imperatives). See generally MacIntyre, Why is the
Search for the Foundations of Ethics so Frustrating?, 9 HASTINGS CENT. REP., Aug.
1979, at 16, 18 (it is difficult to establish any moral point, but the opposite is not true:
it is often possible to refute an opponent's moral argument by showing that it is either
inconsistent with other moral positions the opponent holds or internally inconsis-
tent).
23 54 Misc. 2d 448, 282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1967).
24 Id. at 451-52, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61.
25 id at 453, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 862-63.
26 Id. at 452-53, 282 N.Y. S.2d at 862. The rabbi testified that the Hebrew Law, or
Shulchan Arukh, contained a specific law, the Jichud, which "absolutely forbids a
woman to stay with a man in a place which is not available to a third person" at the
risk of overwhelming sin and reputational ruin. Id. at 452, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
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on this testimony, the court rejected the state's defense of contributory
negligence and awarded damages.
27
Other courts have heard descriptive testimony from moralists in a variety
of settings. Members of the clergy have testified that a dying patient's refusal of
medical treatment was not in accordance with Scripture,2" that Black Muslim
prisoners may not eat pork,2 9 that certain religious observances would be
offensive to Jews,30 and that a parent's decision to remove life support systems
from his comatose daughter conformed to Roman Catholic belief.31 Descrip-
tive ethicists also have helped courts assess the sincerity of individuals seeking
to avoid military service.3 2 Indeed, the variety of descriptive contexts is
practically limitless; in Peninsula Covenant Church v. San Mateo, 33 a profes-
sor of social ethics testified that the use of swimming pools and tennis courts by
a church group was necessary for its "formal worship ... and study, 34 and
contributed to its "evangelical activity." 3 5 In such cases, the expert purports to
offer objective, factual analysis, and refrains from making any sort of norma-
tive value judgment.
B. Metaethics
Ethical reasoning is often vexingly complicated and opaque, and the
meaning of ethical discourse often obscure. As a result, trial courts seeking
27 Id. at 456, 459, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 865, 868.
28 Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
29 Barnett v. Rogers, 410 F.2d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
30 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1963) (school prayer). For a
more complete version of the descriptive testimony in Schempp, see the lower court
opinion, 177 F. Supp. 398, 401 n.13, 402 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 1959); see also Allen v.
Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (Roman
Catholic priest, Methodist minister, and professor of Christian ethics testified that
nativity scene in government sponsored Christmas pageant had "deeply religious
significance" to Christians); Lanner v. Wimmer, 463 F. Supp. 867, 879-80 (D. Utah
1978) (content of study aids used in public school's off-campus seminars stressed
Mormon tenets and thus violated the first amendment).
31 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 30-31, 355 A.2d 647, 658, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
32 See Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 310 (1956) (religious panel advised draft
board that a seminary student seeking a draft deferment was not preparing "in good
faith" for a career as a rabbi); Ramadass Naturalization Petition, 445 Pa. 86, 92-93,
284 A.2d 133, 136-37 (1971) (professor of religion with expertise in the area of Hindu
theology testified concerning the "depth and extent" of conscientious objector's
religious beliefs).
33. 94 Cal. App. 3d 382, 156 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979).
14 Id. at 390, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
3- Id. at 391, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 435. For yet another descriptive context, see L.A.
Times, April 15, 1981, pt. 1, at 2, col. 4 (describing a case in which a professor
testified on Sicilian beliefs in damages action brought by a bride dishonored by her
husband's public declaration that she was not a virgin on their wedding night).
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resolution of questions that are ethical in nature might call upon experts to
provide metaethical analysis.3 6 Experts testifying in this mode explicate
relationships among ethical concepts and principles without attempting to
prescribe particular rules of conduct. 37 A metaethicist might, for example,
testify that certain evidence would or would not support a descriptive claim,
or that specified conduct would conform to, or violate, a normative rule. In
cases in which the distinction between descriptive and normative questions
is elusive or ill-defined, a metaethicist might help the court sort out the
various concepts.3 8 Through this testimony, the ethical expert would assist
the court in asking the right questions by sharpening its perception of the
issues.
3 9
Metaethical analysis can be particularly useful in certain types of case.
Courts confronting ethical dilemmas associated with novel biomedical
technologies, for example, might call upon a moralist to distinguish moral
issues from medical ones. 40 The moralist could similarly help identify a
particular belief as moral rather than religious or philosophical, or a particu-
36 See generally P. NOWELL-SMITH, supra note 16 (describing metaethics);
P. TAYLOR, NORMATIVE DISCOURSE 298-99 (1961) (same); Nielson, supra note 16, at
117-21 (same). As recently as 20 years ago, English-speaking philosophers regarded
metaethics as the only proper concern for academic moralists. "Today this attitude
has been almost completely abandoned; the best writing. . . combines ethical theory
with concern for concrete ethical issues." Rachels, supra note 22, at 32.
31 Some moralists have combined metaethics with normative and descriptive
analysis. For example, Plato's ethical writings offer an account of what it means to
say that this or that thing is good (metaethics), a great deal of positive moralizing
(normative ethics), and a certain amount of description, sometimes implicit, of
Athenian views of morality. See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (G. Grube trans.
1974).
38 See Radin, supra note 21, at 1157-59 (sorting out normative and descriptive
claims in context of debate over the death penalty).
39 See J. ELY, supra note 1, at 54, 56, 58-59 (moral philosophers can aid courts in
the choice of fundamental values); Yesley, supra note 2, at 1457-58, 1462 (National
Commission created by Congress because philosophers and ethicists can bring spe-
cial expertise to the examination of complex issues presented by newly developed
technologies); see also A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note l, at 87 (moral
philosophy's method of reasoning can aid the Supreme Court in making principled
judgments); J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 46-47 (emphasizing the role of "considered"
moral judgments); Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief From Friendship to Advocacy,
72 YALE L.J. 694, 712 (1963) (amicus briefs used to "sensitize" court to moral
issues); cf. Finkelstein & Fairlie, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970) (courts should use Bayesian analysis to appraise the
significance of identification evidence); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329 (1971) (discussing testimony based on mathematical reasoning).
40 See Stein, The Bioethicists: Facing Matters of Life and Death, 9 SMITHSONIAN,
Jan. 1979, at 107, 115 (analyzing right-to-die issues addressed by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976), from a metaethical viewpoint).
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lar question as moral rather than pedagogical or scientific. 4' In cases in
which the correctness of an individual's planned course of action is debat-
able, a metaethicist might testify that the action is arguably or sufficiently
"moral" to warrant respect for the individual's authority to decide. 42 Fi-
nally, a metaethicist might offer insight on the morality or immorality of
certain acts in light of a given set of objectives. 4 3 By performing these
functions, the moralist facilitates the court's preliminary analysis of the
relevant issues without engaging in positive moralizing.
C. Normative Ethics
Normative ethics concern moral rules, either in general or particular
terms, that govern the conduct of individuals and societies. 44 A code of
normative rules may be prescriptive, proscriptive, or a combination of both.
A particular normative system may be very detailed, very general, or
41 The current debate about what should be taught in the public schools contains
arguments over whether a given position is a moral position or a scientific one. Is a
school district that resolves the controversy over Creationism versus Darwinism
making a scientific, or a religious and moral judgment? See Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution theories violates the
first amendment); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 50 U.S.L.W. 2412 (E.D. Ark.
Jan. 5, 1982) (statute requiring "creation-science" to be taught in public schools
invalid under the first amendment); see also Font v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 891, 893 (D.
Md. 1970) (ministers and professor of theology characterize army lieutenant's objec-
tion to Vietnam war as religious in nature; however, selective opposition to a
particular war held insufficient grounds for discharge).
42 See Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 415 (5th Cir. 1974) (rabbi evaluated the
genuineness of an individual's consent to risky and morally problematic open-heart
surgery); cf. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill. 2d 577,
592-98, 328 N.E.2d 268, 276-80 (1975) (diverse testimony concerning the validity of a
bishop's defrockment under relevant church law; testimony contains elements of
descriptive and metaethical analysis). See generally Delgado, Religious Totalism as
Slavery, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. Soc. CHANGE 51 (1980).
43 See In re Adoption of "E," 59 N.J. 35, 49-50, 279 A.2d 785, 792 (1971) (court
may take religion into account in adoption proceedings as indication of would-be
parents' moral fitness; amici church groups had argued that religious membership be
required as a matter of law); cf. Yesley, supra note 2, at 1455-64 (National Commis-
sion, charged by Congress with practical objectives, approached issues from utili-
tarian ethical perspective and applied scientific data to determine "impacts"). Com-
pare Yesley, supra note 1, at 5 (National Commission recommended against ban on
psychosurgery in prison research, largely on the basis of "empirical research ... that
found some . . . benefit . . . and little indication of untoward side effects"), with
Cooper v. Nix, 343 F. Supp. 1101, 1108 (W.D. La. 1972) (Methodist lay minister
testified concerning the educational and moral impact of a university requirement
that students live in on-campus housing), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 496 F.2d 1285
(5th Cir. 1974).
44 Nielson, supra note 16, at 117-21; see also M. SCHLICK, PROBLEMS OF ETHICS
1-30 (D. Rynin trans. 1939); P. TAYLOR, supra note 36, at 60-65.
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mixed-detailed in some areas and general in others.45 Trial courts necessar-
ily engage in normative analysis in cases of first impression, 46 and often
reason normatively in cases governed by stare decisis when they overrule
settled precedent in favor of more desirable rules of law.
47
Trial courts seeking resolution of ethical dilemmas occasionally have
called upon moral philosophers for normative advice. Testifying in the
normative mode, the moralist declares acts or rules of law under considera-
tion by the court right or wrong per se, or right or wrong according to the
values that underlie our legal system. 4 8 Moralists perform a similar function
when they offer advice on the moral standing of actors to make certain
decisions. For example, a moralist might testify about the standing of par-
ents to subject a child to a given degree of risk for the benefit of another, or
society generally. 49 Or, a moralist might testify about the standing of a
parent, child, doctor, friend, or other person to decide that the life of a
terminally ill patient, unborn fetus, endangered pregnant woman, deformed
newborn, or healthy newborn in an overpopulated society is not worth
preserving, either in absolute terms or on balance against benefits associated
with termination.5 0 These functions merge when the moralist advises the
4 For an example of a system illustrating all of these possibilities, see the ethical
code laid out in the Ten Commandments, Exodus 20:3-17.
46 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing issues associated with
biomedical technologies).
47 See sources cited supra, note 2; see also M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, BIOETHICS
AND LAW 72 (1981) (identifying points at which normative analysis enters into
judicial reasoning).
48 See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972)
(proposed organ transplant from incompetent donor); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647 (discontinuation of life support), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In a
criminal context, an expert might testify that an agreement to perform certain acts
constituted a conspiracy because the proposed conduct would have been immoral
had it been carried out. See W.*LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 470-73 (1972)
(agreement to commit immoral acts punishable, in some jurisdictions, as a conspir-
acy); see also R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 208 ("The Constitution makes our
conventional political morality relevant to the question of validity [of laws]; any
statute that appears to compromise that morality raises constitutional questions.");
cf. Yesley, supra note 1, at 6 (ethicist testified that course of action before the
National Commission would contravene the "values of the First Amendment").
49 See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972)
(standing of parents to authorize kidney transplant between identical twins); Yesley,
supra note 1, at 5 (moralists debated issue of moral standing in connection with fetal
research).
So See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 547, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976) (upholding standing of parent, doctor, and hospital ethics committee to au-
thorize removal of life support system from comatose patient); Dockery v. Dockery,
559 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. 1977) (lower court ruled that physician had no authority to
use extraordinary means to sustain life of comatose patient without family consent;
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court about the morality or immorality of a course of action planned by a
party with standing to decide.' 1
Hart v. Brown5 2 illustrates the close relationship among the various types
of moral testimony. In Hart, the parents of seven-year-old twin girls sought a
court order authorizing an isograft kidney transplant between the children
after physicians had refused to perform the operation.5 3 No case law in the
jurisdiction approved nontherapeutic medical treatment for patients incapa-
ble of consent . 4 The parents were prepared to give proxy consent for the
patient's death rendered case moot on appeal). Compare In re McNutly, 4 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2255, 2256 (Essex County, Mass. Prob. Ct. Feb. 15, 1978) (surgery for
deaf, blind, and retarded rubella baby ordered despite refusal of consent by parents),
with Press, Who Speaks for the Child?, 94 NEWSWEEK, Sept. 3, 1979, at 49 (doctor
testified that life of child suffering from Down's syndrome was "devoid of those
qualities which give it human dignity"). See generally Veatch, supra note 15 (discuss-
ing use of court-ordered hospital "ethics" committees to make difficult decisions
regarding dying patients); Yesley, supra note 2, at 1459-61 (National Commission
analyzed rights of fetuses vis- -vis parents, experimenters, and society); Sullivan,
supra note 14 (use of philosophers as ethical advisors in New York hospitals);
Interview with Judy Ross, Associate, Program in Medicine, Law & Human Values,
University of California at Los Angeles, in Westwood, CA (May 29, 1980) (ethicists
in UCLA Program in Medicine, Law & Human Values testified in trial of physician
charged with homicide of unborn fetus, and as advisors to court in case of aged
patient who refused lifesaving medical treatment).
5' In general, testimony concerning the morality of a decision by a party with
standing is identical to testimony concerning the morality of an action under consid-
eration by the court itself. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. The functions
may differ, however, when the witness testifies that the individual should be per-
mitted to make the decision, even though the contemplated action may appear wrong
to the witness or others. For example, some who condemn abortion as immoral also
believe they may be wrong in their judgment, and that the mother, or mother and
doctor, have better moral standing to decide particular cases. Slavery, by contrast, is
so wrong that society does not tolerate it, even though the volunteer slave-the
individual with the (presumably) best moral standing-is willing to become a slave.
See generally Delgado, supra note 42, at 54, 60-63. In cases of this nature, the moral
expert may help the court decide when to respect, and when to override, the wishes
of those immediately concerned.
52 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972).
13 Id. at 369, 289 A.2d at 387. An isograft is a transfer of tissue between one-egg
twins who carry the same genetic material. A homograft, by contrast, involves a
transfer of tissue between a donor and a donee who carry different genetic material,
creating the danger of rejection by the donee. Id. at 370, 289 A.2d at 388.
54 Id. at 370, 289 A.2d at 387-88. The court did, however, rely upon cases from
other jurisdictions for precedential support, including Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121
(D.C. Cir. 1941) (consent of parent necessary for a skin graft from a 15-year-old
boy to his severely burned cousin); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969)
(authorizing parental consent to kidney transplant from a mentally incompetent adult
to the incompetent's brother), and three unreported Massachusetts cases, Foster v.
Harrison, No. 68674 (Mass. Nov. 20, 1957); Hushey v. Harrison, No. 68651 (Mass.
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operation, but the court questioned the morality of their decision.5 5 Forced
to decide whether the parents had standing to make such a choice, the court
sought to balance "the rights of the natural parents and rights of minor
children-more directly, the rights of the donor child," and invoked the aid
of various experts.
5 6
One of the experts the court heard was a clergyman, who testified that the
Harts' authorization was "morally and ethically sound. ' 57 In the court's
view, the clergyman's testimony helped ensure a "close, independent and
objective investigation" of the parents' motives and reasoning.5 8 Indeed,
review by a "community representation" that included the clergyman
seemed to place the court's opinions in stark relief: an isograft would almost
certainly enable both donor and donee to lead normal and happy lives, while
nonauthorization would force the donee to endure continued dialysis treat-
ment or the "cruel and inhuman" consequences of a homograft transfer
from one of the parents.5 9 Convinced that the parents' choice was morally
justified under the unusual facts and circumstances of the case, the court
upheld their standing to give proxy consent.
60
Aug. 30, 1957); Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 (Mass. June 12, 1957) (equity court
may permit parents to consent to kidney transplant between minor twins). But see In
re Guardianship of Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 8-9, 226 N.W.2d 180, 182 (1978) (refusing
to authorize guardian's consent to a lifesaving kidney transplant from a 39-year-old
mental incompetent to his 38-year-old sister on the ground that "no advantage should
be taken of [the incompetent]" when he was incapable of consenting himself and "no
benefit to him [had] been established").
-1 29 Conn. Supp. at 369, 289 A.2d at 386-87.
56 Id. at 375-76, 289 A.2d at 390.
57 Id. at 371, 289 A.2d at 389. The court also heard testimony from medical experts
who testified concerning the relative risklessness of an isograft as compared with
alternative treatments, and from a psychiatrist who testified that the donor strongly
identified with her twin and would derive long-term benefit from undergoing the
procedure. Id., 289 A.2d at 389.
58 Id. at 372, 289 A.2d at 390.
-9 Id. at 373, 289 A.2d at 391.
The court noted that patients undergoing homografts must take suppressive drugs
to combat rejection, and that such drugs often cause bone marrow toxicity, liver
damage, Cushing syndrome, and other severely debilitating effects. Id. at 371, 289
A.2d at 389.
60 Id. at 373, 289 A.2d at 391; cf. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 30, 355 A.2d 647, 658
("[I1t is not usual for matters of religious dogma to enter a civil litigation . . .
[nonetheless, the views of Roman Catholic Church on termination of life support
devices] were rightly admitted in evidence . . . [insofar as they bore upon] the
character and motivations in all respects of Joseph Quinlan as prospective guard-
ian."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). But see In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 67
Wis. 2d 4, 12, 226 N.W.2d 180, 184 (1975) (rejecting the doctrine of substituted
judgment; dissent maintained that authorizing kidney transplant from an incompetent
donor would "endow[ ] him with the finest qualities of his humanity, land] assume[ ]
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Moralists also have performed an essentially normative function by acting
as character witnesses, or "vouchers" for individuals charged with certain
crimes and offenses. For example, members of the clergy and professors of
ethics have testified that persons as diverse as a prospective attorney seek-
ing admission to the bar and a heroin distributor possessed "good" moral
character. 6' In this context, the expert in effect asserts: "I am a moralist; I
am testifying for X; hence X must be a good person since I would not
otherwise have testified in his behalf." 62 Of course, character assessment
generally does not require commentary on what might be termed the central
issue of the case, and thus differs from the type of testimony offered in
Hart.63 It nonetheless fits within the normative mode because it presents a
broad declaration of morality or immorality by a witness with a supposed
mastery of such concepts.
III. THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Whether courts should permit moralists to testify in any of these modes is
initially a question of evidence law.64 Evidentiary rules in almost every
the goodness of his nature instead of assuming the opposite").
61 In re United States v. Wright, 542 F.2d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 1976) (heroin dis-
tributor), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977); In re Anastaplo, 18 I11. 2d 182, 207-09,
163 N.E.2d 429, 442-43 (1960) (Bristow, J., dissenting) (attorney), aff'd, 366 U.S. 82
(1961); see also Estate of Toomes, 54 Cal. 509, 511-17 (1880) (reversible error to
exclude testimony of Catholic priest on issue of testatrix's mental competence to
make a will); State v. Wangberg, 272 Minn. 204, 206-07, 136 N.W.2d 853, 854-55
(1965) (rejecting prosecutor's argument that court should hold clergyman's son to a
higher standard of conduct due to familiarity with Scripture, and should reject
insanity defense as not in accord with Divine Law); Burt v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. 397,
439, 40 S.W. 1000, 1003 (1897) (court accepted clergyman's testimony that defendant
was insane, but refused to qualify him as an expert because having "read some
authors on moral and intellectual science, but nothing on insanity or medical juris-
prudence" did not constitute sufficient qualification).
62 Interview with Richard Wasserstrom, supra note 14 (proposing "voucher"
role).
63 Courts often reject offers of proof relating to character on grounds of irrele-
vance. See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1145-48 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reject-
ing argument that heroin addict's absence of free will constituted a defense to a
criminal charge for possession); cf. United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 701 (8th
Cir. 1972) (testimony concerning morality of defendants' acts held not admissible as
a defense to a charge of disrupting Selective Service operations); United States v.
Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 338 (D. Md. 1968) (similar holding).
64 Expert testimony is a form of exception to the evidentiary rules requiring
personal knowledge, see FED. R. EvID. 602, barring hearsay, see FED. R. EvID. 802,
and forbidding certain forms of opinion testimony, see FED. R. EvID. 701. Courts
would likely evaluate testimony from expert moralists under the rules relating to
expert testimony, although other rules and doctrines could pose problems in particu-
lar cases. See infra notes 227-39 and accompanying text (first amendment lim-
itations).
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jurisdiction permit admission of expert testimony when it is relevant to the
particular case 5 and necessary or helpful to the trier of fact's understanding
of the issues.66 Beyond this, the law requires only that the particular expert
called to testify possess sufficient skill or knowledge to provide an illuminat-
ing opinion, inference, or observation. 67 In cases involving expert moralists,
courts have applied this standard without considering the potential differ-
ences between morality and more traditional subjects of expert testimony,
particularly those bearing on ascertainment of expertise. 68 Examination of
these issues requires a brief overview of the law of expert testimony, and
then a discussion of the applicatons of this law to the descriptive, metaethi-
cal, and normative modes of ethical analysis.
A. Subjects of Expert Testimony
Certain matters are provable only by means of expert testimony. These
subjects are generally unfamiliar to ordinary judges and jurors, and "so far
partake[] of the nature of a science, art, or trade" as to require explication
by persons with special skill, training, or experience. 69 The trial court has
65 See FED. R. EVID. 401; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 13, at 29-30. See
generally 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, §§ 555-563 (rule of experiential capacity
requires qualification as expert for testimony on certain subjects); Ladd, supra note
6, at 416-17.
66 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 702.
67 See id. 702; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 13, at 30; cf. FED. R. EvID. 602
(witness must demonstrate personal knowledge of a matter or qualify as an expert to
give testimony).
68 In few, if any, cases in which moral experts have testified have qualifications of
the witness been disputed, perhaps because of deference to the cloth, the im-
pressiveness of the witnesses' qualifications, the court's wish for help in an acute
dilemma, or the lack of a timely objection. See supra Section II. Greater awareness
of the differences in the types of function these experts perform may lead to an
increased number of challenges.
69 H. ROGERS, THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 29 (B. Werne ed. 1941); see,
e.g.. United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1361 (5th Cir. 1978) (admitting
testimony by an experienced smoker and seller of marijuana on source of seized
contraband, a subject not "likely to be within the knowledge of an average juror");
Kurkuruza v. General Elec. Co., 510 F.2d 1208, 1211-14 (1st Cir. 1975) (tes-
timony by electrical engineer that "jolt" experienced by plaintiff was an electric
shock); Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84, 88 (5th Cir. 1966)
(expert testimony on market value of natural gas); Baenitz v. Ladd, 363 F.2d 969, 971
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (expert testimony on highly technical matters of chemistry); Central
Trust Co. v. United States, 305 F.2d 393, 399 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (expert opinion on
market value of stock in a closely held corporation); Taylor v. Town of Monroe, 43
Conn. 36 (1875) (professional road builders permitted to testify as to safety of a road;
persons who travelled the road daily were not); cases cited at supra note 6; see also
Gisriel v. Uniroyal, Inc., 517 F.2d 699, 701-02 (8th Cir. 1975); New Mexico Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 454 F.2d 328, 335 (10th Cir. 1972)
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discretion to decide whether a given subject fits this description, 70 although
precedent and statutes 71 may guide the determination. Due to advances in
technology and learning, the class of subjects requiring expert analysis
constantly changes.7 2 Within the class, however, the testimonial require-
ments are constant: no witness may testify without first establishing qual-
ifications as an expert in the particular field. 73
The rules are slightly different for subjects falling within the scope of
common understanding. Any person is presumably competent to testify on
such matters under the rule of experiential capacity, 7 4 and earlier decisions
usually excluded expert testimony on that basis. 75 Most modern courts,
however, apply a "helpfulness" test, which gives courts discretion to admit
expert testimony whenever it will aid the trier's understanding of the evi-
dence or issues. 76 Under this standard, that the trier has a general under-
standing is not determinative so long as the expert's testimony can better
equip the trier to decide. 77 Courts have applied the helpfulness test in
(both emphasizing highly technical nature of issues requiring expert testimony); 2
J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 13, at 30; Ladd, supra note 6, at 417 (on certain matters,
judges and juries are "helpless without [the] aid" of experts).
70 United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382 (1st Cir. 1979); Maastchappij Voor
Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Co., 590 F.2d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907
(1979); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 13, at 30 & n.67.
7' See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (1981) (permitting expert testimony in
obscenity cases).
72 J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 250-51 (5th ed. 1965).
73 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 556, at 751.
74 Id. ("sufficient experience [on these matters] is possessed by every person of
ordinary fortunes in life") (emphasis in original).
71 H. ROGERS, supra note 69, § 36; see, e.g., Patterson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 130
Md. 645, 652-53, 101 A. 589, 591 (1917); Shaw v. Natural Handle Co., 188 N.C. 222,
233, 124 S.E. 325, 330 (1924); see also Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 364 F.2d
266, 274 (5th Cir. 1966) ("If the question is one which the layman is competent
to determine for himself, the [expert's] opinion is excluded; if he reasonably cannot
form his own conclusion without the assistance of the expert, the testimony is
admissible."). Courts generally presume that subjects of testimony fall within com-
mon knowledge and experience, and require a showing of expertise only if the
circumstances of the case so demand. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 559.
76 E.g., Miller v. Pillsbury Co., 33 Ill. 2d 514, 516, 211 N.E.2d 733, 734 (1965);
Currier v. Grossman's of New Hampshire, Inc., 107 N.H. 159, 161, 219 A.2d 273,
274-75 (1966); Swartley v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 70 Wash. 2d 17, 22, 421 P.2d
1009, 1013 (1%6); FED. R. EvID. 702; see 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[01] (1981); 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1923 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978); Ladd, Expert and Other Opinion Testimony, 40 MINN. L.
REV. 437, 443 (1956); Ladd, supra note 6, at 418-19.
77 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 13, at 30 (helpfulness test emphasizes "true
function of expert testimony"); cf. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35
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admitting both expert and nonexpert testimony on a variety of matters,
including questions of valuation78 and questions of general health, physical
appearance, and sanity in the area of medical and psychological judg-
ments .79
The modern tendency to admit expert testimony whenever it is helpful is
subject to one important qualification, however. At any point in the devel-
opment of human knowledge, certainty on some matters, such as the mech-
anism of cancer causation,8 ° may be impossible. Even the best experts are
not competent to form reliable opinions on these matters, and thus, tes-
timony by either lay or expert witnesses is inadmissible.8 1 Outside of this
category, however, both the admissibility and credibility of expert testimony
turns upon the qualifications of the witness.
B. Establishment of Qualifications
The requirements for qualification as an expert witness vary from case to
case. On some matters, such as medical judgments, case or statutory law
may require that the witness be a member of a profession.82 Generally,
(1962) ("[E]xpert testimony not only is unnecessary, but indeed may be properly
excluded in the discretion of the trial judge 'if all the primary facts can be accurately
and intelligently described to thejury. . . . ' " (quoting United States Smelting Co. v.
Parry, 166 F. 407, 415 (8th Cir. 1909)).
78 See, e.g., Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United
States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1038-39 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (nonexpert assessment
of aesthetic impacts by defendant's building agent taken at face value); Corcoran v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 132 N.J. Super. 234, 244-45, 333 A.2d 293, 299 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1975) (admitting expert testimony on value of ring); L. DUBOFF, THE
DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 525-30, 606-15 (1977) (courts prefer testimony of experts on
questions of value of art objects and antiques). But cf. King v. United States, 292 F.
Supp. 767, 775-76 (D. Colo. 1968) (refusing to admit expert testimony to establish
price a museum might pay for weapons used in the assassination of President
Kennedy).
79 See, e.g., Moore v. Parks, 458 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Mo. 1979) (admitting testimony
by qualified expert on extent of disability suffered); Stanley v. Ford Motor Co., 49
A.D. 2d 979, 980, 374 N.Y.S.2d 370, 372 (App. Div. 1975) (lay witnesses may testify
"as to a person's strength, vigor, feebleness and illness and his comparative condi-
tion from day to day"); 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 568.
Lay witnesses need not establish competence before testifying, id. § 556, at 751,
but are subject to more stringent limitations on the scope and form of their testimony
than are experts, see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
80 Tonkovich v. Department of Labor & Indus., 31 Wash. 2d 220, 226-27, 195 P.2d
638, 641-48 (1948) (rejecting expert's testimony as to the origin of claimant's cancer
on the ground that cause of cancer is unknown to medical science).
81 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 13, at 31; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 76, 702[03]; Ladd, supra note 6, at 419.
82 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1284 (West Supp. 1981) ("Unlicensed physi-
cians [sic] shall not be . . .allowed to testify as a medical or surgical expert in any
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however, courts do not prescribe any minimum standard of education,
professional level, or experience, and ask only whether the expert can
provide a helpful inference or opinion. 83 If the expert cannot, the testimony
is superfluous and hence inadmissible.
The cases illustrate the flexibility of analysis in this area. Some witnesses
with little or no formal training have qualified as experts on the basis of
experience in an area. 84 Other witnesses lacking practical experience have
qualified on the basis of systematic training or education.8 5 Most experts
seek to qualify by demonstrating both qualities; the determination of a
particular witness' qualifications lies within the broad discretion of the trial
court.
86
C. Form and Scope of Testimony
Once qualified, an expert enjoys greater testimonial freedom than does an
ordinary witness. A lay witness must provide a factual report based on
personal observation, and may offer an opinion only to facilitate communi-
cation to the jury. 87 Qualified experts, by contrast, may convey factual
observations, state opinions or inferences, and provide generalizations from
which others can form opinions. Courts traditionally have required that
testimony of this nature be based upon the expert's firsthand observation,
court .... "); 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2090; cf. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-7
(Supp. 1980) (examination by two reputable, licensed physicians or one physician
and one psychologist required to commit any person for mental treatment).
83 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 13, at 30; Ladd, supra note 6, at 421-22.
14 See, e.g., Santana Marine Serv., Inc. v. McHale, 346 F.2d 147, 148 (5th Cir.
1965) (witness with six years of experience in designing, manufacturing and installing
boat lift held qualified despite lack of professional education); Grohusky v. Atlas
Assurance Co., 195 Kan. 626, 629-30, 408 P.2d 697, 700-01 (1965) (witness with 17
years of experience in insurance business held qualified as an expert despite a lack of
formal training).
85 See Yarborough v. City of Warren, 383 F. Supp. 676, 682-83 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
(witness with a doctorate in sociology and several years teaching experience per-
mitted to testify as expert as to impact of city referendum). See generally 3
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 76, 702[04] (discussing admissibility of
expert testimony based on qualifications of the expert).
86 See C. McCORMICK, supra note 6, § 13, at 30; Ladd, supra note 6, at 421-22.
The testimony of an expert witness typically begins with a recital of his or her
qualifications unless the opposing side has stipulated the witness' expertise. See
Ladd, supra note 6, at 422. If the opposing side is not satisfied with the credentials of
the expert, it may lodge an objection and demand additional evidence concerning the
witness' qualifications. See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 562.
87 See FED. R. EVID. 701 (limiting opinion evidence by lay witness to opinions
"rationally based on the perception of the witness and . . . helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony .... ); UNIFORM R. EvID. 701 (1974) (similar rule).
See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, §§ 11-12; 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 76,
§§ 1918, 1924.
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facts in the record, or hypotheses presented at trial.8 8 The Federal Rules of
Evidence go further, however, and permit reliance on otherwise inadmissi-
ble data or authorities so long as they are "of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field." 8 9 Disclosure of underlying facts or data
prior to testimony is generally not required under the Federal Rules, al-
though opposing counsel may demand disclosure on cross-examination.90
Other liberalizations of modem evidence law broaden the scope of per-
missible expert testimony. For example, courts at one time permitted no
opinion testimony on the "ultimate issue" in a case.9' The Federal and
Uniform Rules of Evidence, 92 as well as a majority of states, 93 reject this
view and permit witnesses to offer opinions on issues as central as causa-
tion.04 Modern evidentiary codes also contain provisions governing court
appointment of impartial expert witnesses and providing for their compensa-
tion. 95 The drafters of these provisions recognized that court appointment in
some circumstances might cloak an expert with an undeserved aura of
infallibility, but nonetheless encourage the practice as a means of avoiding
an unseemly "battle of the experts."
9 6
" See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 14; Ladd, supra note 6, at 426.
89 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note;see 3J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 76, 703[02].
90 FED. R. EVID. 705.
9' C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 12, at 27. The common law rule,justified on the
ground that testimony on the "ultimate issue" would invade the province of the jury,
id., drew criticism from the commentators, see 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6,
§§ 1920-1921; Ladd, supra note 6, at 423-25.
92 FED. R. EVID. 704; UNIF. R. EVID. 704 (1974).
9' C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 12, at 27; see, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 805
(West 1966).
94 See, e.g., Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Comm., 19 111. 2d 236, 243,
166 N.E.2d 582, 586 (1960) (medical expert permitted to give opinion on cause of
death); But see Schweiger v. Solbeck, 191 Or. 454, 472-73, 230 P.2d 195, 203 (1951)
(testimony of expert on land movements in a particular geographic region relating to
cause of a landslide held inadmissible as speculative under the circumstances). The
Federal Rules jettisoned the "ultimate issue" prohibition because it was "unduly
restrictive, difficult of application, and generally served only to deprive the trier of
fact of useful inforijIation." FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee note.
95 See FED. R. EVID. 706; UNIF. R. EVID. 706 (1974); CAL. EVID. CODE
§§ 730-733 (West 1966); see also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 76,
706[04] (canvassing state evidentiary rules governing appointment of neutral ex-
perts). These provisions codify the well-recognized inherent power of trial judges to
call experts. See Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1962);
Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witnesses, 29 S.
CAL. L. REv. 195 (1956).
96 See FED. R. EVID. 706; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 17; cf. People v.
Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968) (excluding expert
scientific testimony on probability theory in criminal case on the ground that it would
lead to paralysis of jury's function).
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The law of expert testimony thus provides several general principles for
assessing the appropriateness of testimony by moralists. Even when judges
and jurors possess a general understanding of a particular moral question,
expert testimony is potentially admissible under the helpfulness standard.
Moreover, to the extent that a particular question lies beyond the under-
standing of untrained lay persons and does not rest upon ordinary observa-
tion, 97 any person who testifies should have to qualify as an expert. In either
circumstance, the fact that the witness offers an opinion on an "ultimate
moral issue" or relies on a body of ethical principles received out of court
would not constitute a bar in most jurisdictions. Questions of moral philoso-
phy involving mere speculation and conjecture., however, would not seem
amenable to testimony of any sort, and to the extent that moral expertise is
impossible, no witness could qualify as an expert.
9 8
IV. MORAL EXPERTISE: PROMISE AND LIMITATIONS
The foregoing analysis suggests that the moralist's purely descriptive
function fits most comfortably within our existing jurisprudence. For exam-
ple, a person familiar with a moral or religious system can testify compe-
tently on the way acts would be viewed in that system. 99 Because lay
persons are often more or less ignorant on such questions, the testimony of
an expert sometimes will be necessary to ensure that the trier of fact is
adequately informed. 0 0 Experts on these matters are usually identifiable-
97 Some moral philosophers believe that moral properties of things and acts may
be ascertained by a process similar to perception. See infra notes 185-203 and
accompanying text (ethical intuitionism). Compare Sibley, Aesthetic and
Nonaesthetic, 74 PHIL. REV. 135, 138 (1965) (aesthetic properties of objects are
"emergent" in that they come from nonaesthetic properties of the objects them-
selves), with Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (hard-core pornography is a distinct and easily identifiable class of mate-
rial which has been characterized uniformly as obscene; "It is that, and that alone,
which ... government may constitutionally suppress .... ") and Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (admitting uncertainty concerning
definition of obscenity but positing that "I know it when I see it .... "). But see
R. HARE, supra note 18, at 79-93 (1952) (criticizing "ethical naturalist" view that
ethical attributes reside in things or acts in the natural world).
98 A skeptical view of morality has had its adherents through the ages. See infra
note 147 (Nietzschean disdain of all conventional morality); note 148 and accom-
panying text (Socratic skepticism). For a discussion of its impact in the area of
normative expert testimony, see infra notes 110-122 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text (discussing Friedman v. New
York).
o00 In the area of foreign law, by analogy, some English courts have required
witnesses to be in "an occupation, making necessary familiarity with law," although
many take a case-by-case approach to experiential competence. 2 J. WICMORE, supra
note 6, § 564, at 777. To the extent that courts view morality as an integrated system
of rules and laws, they might also seek expert testimony on ethical matters.
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persons trained in a body of religious law, for instance. Moreover, when the
subject of the testimony is well-defined and clearly descriptive, the kind of
showing necessary to establish the expert's qualifications generally will be
obvious. 101
Friedman v. New York illustrates the appropriateness of descriptive ethi-
cal testimony under evidence law. 10 2 The question of morals before the
court-whether the plaintiff's behavior conformed with her "ultraor-
thodox" religious principles-was clearly relevant to the case and not a
subject of common understanding. If the rabbi's qualifications to testify as
an expert had been called into question, they could have been established by
evidence that his training and years of experience made him knowledgeable
about the moral beliefs of persons raised in that tradition. The actual cor-
rectness of the Jichud's normative prohibition, or of the rabbi's own moral
views, would have been irrelevant. Thus limited, the moralist's testimony
was helpful, subject to verification on cross-examination,1 0 3 and properly
admitted. Testimony of this kind seems to be no different in principle from
expert testimony on such subjects as ballistics or mental fatigue.1 0 4
Similar reasoning supports admitting testimony on the conformity or non-
conformity of an act to a community's moral standard from a witness with a
polltaker's or sociologist's expertise. 10 Although we all presumably have
some familiarity with the moral standards of the communities in which we
reside, a properly trained person who has applied scientific or statistical
methods to that question can help the court by providing objective analysis.
Because such testimony rests on identifiable factual data, it is more easily
subjected to critical evaluation through cross-examination than lay tes-
timony based on personal observation alone, and for that reason is likely to
be more reliable.
Expert metaethical analysis, too, although less common in the trial con-
text, should usually be admissible under the law of expert testimony. It is
difficult for lay witnesses and even courts to be sure of the nature of the
interests at stake when confronted by complex moral dilemmas. A person
trained in moral or practical reasoning could help reduce such uncertainty by
unravelling complex moral argumentation, explaining moral concepts or
terms, and identifying fallacies. Untrained jurors are ordinarily unfamiliar
with this type of analysis, but it is potentially useful for a thoughtful resolu-
tion of issues in difficult cases of first impression.
The situation presented in Hart v. Brown illustrates how a witness might
convey metaethical expertise in a courtroom setting. In that case the court
had to decide whether to authorize nontherapeutic treatment for an incom-
101 The expert witness need not be a social scientist; a nonscientist with longstand-
ing acquaintance with the group might well qualify. See supra note 84.
102 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
103 See Friedman, 54 Misc. 2d at 452, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
104 See supra note 6.
10s See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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petent, and might well have appointed a metaethicist to analyze the moral
principles and interests implicated by the proposed transplant. A sound
decision seemingly required separation of non-normative questions (What is
the purpose of the operation? Will it succeed? What will the donor's attitude
towards the decision be upon reaching maturity?) from normative ones
(Does morality permit-or require-a person to sacrifice a measure of his or
her own physical well-being to improve that of another? Does morality
permit-or require-a person to extract such a sacrifice from a second
person to benefit a third person?). An expert trained and experienced in the
analysis of complex moral problems can perform this preliminary analysis
without presuming to suggest answers to any of the normative questions that
the analysis discovers. The trier thereafter retains complete autonomy to
resolve the normative questions as it wishes.
Thus, existing principles of evidence law seem to provide for the admis-
sion of either descriptive or metaethical testimony. Indeed, descriptive
ethicists have long played an important role in the trial process,10 6 and
metaethicists may come to the fore as moral issues facing trial courts grow
increasingly complex. Courts should encourage the use of these moralists in
appropriate situations.
The legitimacy of using moralists to provide normative testimony is far
less certain. One could argue that no one possesses special "knowledge" of
normative ethics; 0 7 that if anyone does, such a person would not possess it
to a degree warranting the designation "expert"; or that if anyone is a moral
expert of this type, we are all moral experts and hence not in need of special
testimony. Under this view "moralists" could not possibly help courts since
they would be no more fit to resolve ethical issues than anyone else. Further,
even if normative expertise exists, courts might have difficulty identifying
who has it. Unlike expertise in mathematics, engineering, or other technical
fierds, normative moral expertise might not correlate with any particular
training or formal qualifications. If moral expertise requires instead a virtu-
ous character or wise moral judgment, it may be difficult to qualify anyone as
an expert. Also, if moral expertise exists and those who possess it are
identifiable, it must be transmissible through a process approximating
courtroom testimony.10 8 Finally, resort to normative ethical testimony may
106 See Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts 158, 159-62 (Pa. 1840) (witnesses familiar with
marriage customs of Protestant settlers permitted to testify on marriage arrangements
in what is now Mississippi); The Sussex Peerage, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1046-47 (H.L.
1844) (Roman Marriage law provable by testimony of Catholic bishop).
107 Compare R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 138-40 (skeptical view of morality,
citing statement of Learned Hand that moral rights are merely expressions of judges'
personal preferences), with Rachels, supra note 22 (discussing and rejecting the view
that morals are purely subjective, or merely disguised imperatives).
108 In some cases, the requirement that experts base opinions or inferences on
sources "reasonably relied upon by experts in a particular field" might present
problems. FED. R. EvID. 703. Experts testifying on matters of physical science base
conclnsions on experimental evidence, and the authority of a work or methodology
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present subtle dangers at an institutional level not posed, or at least not so
acutely, by descriptive or metaethical expert testimony-problems not ade-
quately met by the mundane requirements of the law of expert testimony. 109
These problems potentially undermine the admissibility of normative ethi-
cal testimony. Yet the novelty and problematic nature of normative tes-
timony should not cause its rejection out-of-hand; courts in cases like Hart
have apparently found resort to normative experts useful, albeit without
careful analysis. Assessment of the moralist's normative role thus requires
further inquiry. The remainder of this Article addresses the various objec-
tions, and considers when and from whom courts might hear testimony on
matters of normative ethics.
V. NORMATIVE EXPERTS IN THE COURTROOM
A. Potential Barriers to Normative Expert Testimony
1. The Relativist Objection
One objection that is likely to be raised against normative testimony is that
all morals are "relative." Moral relativism can take a number of different
forms, but whatever form it takes, it tends to call all normative testimony
into question."10 In its extreme form, relativism maintains that one ethical
view is no better than any other, and that moral statements are nothing more
than expressions of personal preference."' On this view, there is no room
for moral experts because there is nothing to be an expert about. The search
for objectively "moral" results is therefore futile, and morality is irrelevant
to the judicial process.
remains intact only so long as its conclusions and predictions accord with the
evidence. See Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 552-53 (7th Cir. 1980).
For many, however, moral views are not derived from, or confirmed by, any kind of
public data. See generally J. ELY, supra note 1, at 58 (lack of a single, agreed-upon
method of moral philosophy is demonstrated by conflicting conclusions of J. RAWLS,
supra note 1, and R. NOZiCK, ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA (1974)). Thus, courts
might have reservations about the reliability of outside sources relied upon by a
moralist. For a further discussion of these issues, see infra notes 110-44 and accom-
panying text.
109 See infra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
10 For a concise discussion of various types of ethical relativism, see M. SHAPIRO
& R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 73-77.
I /d. at 73-74. Shapiro and Spece classify relativist positions into three catego-
ries: those that urge that moral judgments are mere interjections of approval or
disapproval; those that see moral statements as descriptions of the preferences of the
person making the judgment; and those that see them as statements of cultural
approval or disapproval. In each case, "[t]he relativist totally rejects the notion of
objective moral standards." Id. at 74.
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Our legal system has not embraced this radically skeptical position." 2
Indeed, the very existence of moral dilemmas such as the one posed in Hart
implies a rejection of extreme relativism, for such dilemmas would not exist
if all choices were equally right or wrong.' 13 Our jurisprudence is instead
committed to the idea that moral analysis is at least relevant to many types of
legal decisionmaking. The entire course of the common law, as well as the
practice of selecting judges for both wisdom and moral sensitivity, supports
this view." 14 In addition, our constitutional jurisprudence seems committed
112 See authorities cited at supra notes 1-2; infra note 128 and accompanying
text (legal system presupposes that moral mistakes are possible, citing cases on
slavery, segregated schooling, and the death penalty).
As a result, we need not reach the difficult question whether this extreme form of
moral skepticism is true. Our inquiry only concerns the forms of moral expert
testimony appropriate under the general assumptions of our jurisprudential heritage.
Radical moral skepticism, if taken seriously, would not be content with those as-
sumptions, but would demand a complete reconstruction of the legal system. The
task of charting and arguing for such a reconstruction must be left to the true
skeptics.
113 M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 74.
114 Common law theories of fraud, duress, estoppel, mistake, criminalization, and
moral consideration, see Manwill v. Oyler, I I Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961), for
example, seem grounded, at least in part, in judicial notions of right and wrong, e.g.,
LORD DEVLIN, supra note 1 (punishability of homosexuality); Summers, Two Types
of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law Justification, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 707 (1978),(common law is based on various "good" reasons
which are derived from moral, economic, political and other social concerns). Simi-
larly, the development of tort concepts of negligence cannot be satisfactorily ex-
plained solely by theories of economic efficiency. See J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON,
THE TORTS PROCESS 277 (1975) (in developing tort theories, judges should "be
guided by 'the accepted standard of the community, the mores of the times' ")
(emphasis in original) (quoting B. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 108);cf. Introduction to
THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION at x (G. Wood ed. 1973) (purely
economic analysis of Charles Beard's AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913), rejected as overly simplistic by
modern historians). Yet even if common law rules totally lacked moral underpin-
nings, the entire body of equity principles would compel acceptance of the claim that
ethics plays some role in our jurisprudence. See E. RE, Preface to CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EQUITY AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES at xvii (5th ed. 1975) ("[E]quity
is that part of our legal heritage that has given the law an ethical dimension. In
extolling virtues of candor and good faith, it reaffirms the moral element of a just
society."). Moreover, extreme relativism cannot account for legislative regulation
under the police power that concerns not only safety and material welfare but also
morals in the most general sense. For an example of such regulation, see MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272 (West 1970) (proscribing "Crimes against Chastity, Morality,
Decency, and Good Order," including, inter alia, polygamy, incest, sodomy and
buggery, buying or selling dead bodies, removal of flowers from graves, pigeon
shooting, and mutilation of horses).
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to seeking answers to complex moral problems, and is to that extent commit-
ted to the proposition that such answers exist.' 1 5 A court confronting a
difficult moral problem may therefore rely upon jurisprudential tradition in
rejecting extreme relativism as a reason for excluding expert moral tes-
timony.
The relativist objection, however, need not be raised in such absolute
terms. Advocates of a more moderate position seem to concede the exis-
tence of moral dilemmas, but assert that their proper resolution is merely a
function of the morality of a given culture.1 16 According to these cultural
relativists, moral beliefs vary from time to time and place to place. A moral
dilemma confronting a court thus requires a relatively narrow inquiry: what
do the values of this society dictate in this case?1" 7 A cultural relativist
would assert that these veiled questions concerning the actual values of a
society are better entrusted to polltakers or sociologists than to experts in
normative ethics.
The existence of a variety of beliefs about a matter, however, does not
establish that the search for "objective truth" is futile. Views about as-
tronomy and physics vary from one society to another; yet we do not believe
that all such views should receive equal weight. Similarly, the observation
that moral views seem to differ from culture to culture and age to age does
not entail the rejection of moral analysis, nor with it the possibility of ethical
expertise. If one society sanctions removal of organs from live members for
the benefit of others, while another society does not, it does not follow that
organ-robbing is morally neutral. One view might be right and the other
wrong, or both views might be wrong." 8 Standing alone, then, this cultural
relativist thesis is a non sequitur.
115 See supra notes 1, 4; infra note 128.
116 See H. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 74 (describing and evaluating
the "metaethical cultural relativis[t]" objection).
117 Some of the values enshrined in the Constitution may vary in this way. See,
e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring):
[Wihether or not a punishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on whether its
mere mention "shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people," but on
whether people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its
liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable.
Under this standard, Justice Marshall found that the death penalty "violates the
Eighth Amendment because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the United
States at this time in their history." Id. at 360.
I The conflict could also prove illusory. For example, members of one society
may kill their parents when they attain a certain age, while members of another
society venerate them and expend large amounts of resources keeping them alive and
well. The apparent difference between the two value systems may be less than it
appears, however, if the first society believes that persons survive for eternity in the
condition in which they find themselves at the times of their deaths. Both societies
would then subscribe to the moral principle that one ought to treat one's parents
kindly, disagreeing only on the factual question about the nature of the afterlife. See
H. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 74 (Fiji Islanders example). See generally
R. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 271-84 (1959) (discussing ethical relativism).
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Proponents of yet a third form of relativism do not deny that moral
expertise might exist, but assert that courts have no sure way of knowing
who possesses it." l9 These epistemic moral relativists contend that, in con-
trast to statements in sciences such as physics or mathematics, ethical
judgments are inherently incapable of validation by agreed-upon procedures.
The absence of such criteria leads them to the conclusion that no ethical
proposition is more worthy of belief than any other. 120 Epistemic relativism
is consistent with, and usually incorporates, the cultural relativist thesis just
discussed. Together, the two doctrines present a serious challenge to the use
of normative expert witnesses in trial settings. If there are no criteria by
which to test ethical judgments, and none is more worthy of credence than
any other, then the court apparently will be left without any way to ensure
that proffered "expert" ethical testimony is bringing it any closer to objec-
tive moral truth-if indeed such truth exists at all.
Admittedly, normative statements differ from statements about the physi-
cal world in certain respects. Many, indeed, do not depend on external data in
the way that some assertions of science do. Yet difficulty of verification does
not mean that moral statements are inherently unsupportable, or that per-
sons trained in ethical reasoning cannot help courts in given situations.
Philosophical abstractions aside, judges and jurors will universally, or nearly
universally, accept some fundamental norms. The prohibition against point-
less, intentional killing of the innocent is an example. Normative experts
whose testimony is at odds with these fundamental principles are unlikely to
be of any use or interest to a trier of fact grappling with a genuine moral
problem. However, normative experts who can demonstrate the validity of
their assertions by reference to such "ethical data" might provide accept-
able and enlightening opinions. '2 ' Courts or counsel can refer to these data on
cross-examination in deciding how far to credit any particular moralist's
views. Moreover, because such norms in fact underlie all judicial analysis,
philosophical doubts about their status as "objective moral truths" can be
overcome for practical purposes. A relativist is free to insist, for example,
that the basic principles of equality or mercy lack objectively verifiable
moral force; a trial court is not. 12 2 Thus, normative experts may avoid the
19 See M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 75. The authors trace the origin
of this view to logical positivism and its insistence on a verifiability theory of
meaning, in which a sentence has meaning only if it is verifiable, or a tautology.
120 Id. at 76 ("But scientific laws and theories are in the same case: None . . . is
entailed or required by observational evidence alone") (citing R. BRANDT, supra
note 118, at 242-44).
121 A court might require, for example, that ethical views accord with the "consid-
ered moral judgments" that persons in our society actually make. These judgments
could serve as data against which moral views and generalizations are validated, just
as the repeated observations of scientists validate scientific theories. H. SHAPIRO &
R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 78. For further discussion of this possibility and its effect
on the use of normative moralists, see infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
122 See supra note 2 (moral analysis as an inevitable part of the trial court's
function).
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relativist's objections so long as their underlying moral assumptions are
consistent with ethical norms incorporated in our existing jurisprudence.
2. Subversion of Judicial Roles
Apart from relativist objections, an opponent of normative testimony
might raise a second set of related arguments. These concern the danger that
testimony by normative experts might invade the province of the judge or
jury, or, more generally, might discourage active public scrutiny of the
judicial process. There are several possible responses to such objections.
(a) Invading the Province of the Judge or Jury. The "ultimate issue" rule
formerly excluded testimony by any witness on the ultimate issues in a
case. 123 The theory underlying this rule-that "ultimate issue" testimony
was liable to usurp the province of the judge or jury-"is aptly characterized
as 'empty rhetoric' " according to the notes of the Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 124 Yet the rhetoric might be a little less
empty in the case of a normative "expert" admonishing the judge or jury to
reach the "right" result on a moral question central to the decision of a case.
Our system has charged judges with the task of developing law that is both
doctrinally consistent and just, and jurors with representing the moral con-
sensus of the larger community. From jury verdicts in criminal cases, to jury
verdicts calling for sophisticated application of law to fact, and to judges
applying the "conscience of the chancellor" in equity jurisdiction, we have
developed a highly complex legal system designed in large part to work out
what is right and wrong. Yet some judges or jurors might wish to avoid their
heavy responsibility for making difficult moral choices. They can do so if
they can simply adopt the view of a persuasive and qualified normative
expert, effectively trading a difficult moral choice for the simple choice of
whether or not to follow the advice of the particular expert.1 25 Expert
witnesses are neither drawn from the community the way jurors are nor
selected through a political process the way judges are, and to the extent
123 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
124 FED. R. EvID. 704 advisory committee notes (quoting 7 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 6, § 1920, at 17).
125 Moreover, should the decision turn out to be unpopular, a court could shift the
blame to the expert, who would then play the role of the scapegoat. Compare
Krislov, supra note 39, at 711-12 (amici curiae as target for disapprobation of novel or
eccentric views), with T. WOLFE, RADICAL CHIC AND MAU MAUING THE FLAK
CATCHERS (1970) (satirical observation that some social institutions employ "flak
catchers" to absorb and defuse criticism by angry militants). See generally
N. MACHIAVELLI, The Prince in THE PRINCE & OTHER WORKS 93 (A. Gilbert trans.
1941) (ideal ruler, or "prince," would manipulate functionaries to deflect criticism
toward others and thereby solidify own position); Yesley, supra note 2 (use of Ethics
Advisory Commission to still controversy and achieve consensus in sharply divided
areas).
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they unduly influence judicial decisions, those decisions could cease to
reflect the considered judgment of society. Were it to occur, the resulting
abdication would be a disturbing and unacceptable form of institutional
failure. 1
26
It is very difficult to assess this objection in the abstract, since the
likelihood of a normative expert's excessively swaying a judge or juror will
vary with the particular facts of the case, and with the exact use to be made
of the normative testimony. Yet the dangers, despite their legitimacy, should
not require a ban on all normative testimony. They are instead among the
considerations that a court should weigh in exercising its discretion to permit
or exclude a moralist's testimony. In complex medical malpractice cases, by
analogy, an expert's opinion that a physician exercised less than due care
might significantly affect a juror's ultimate decision. The testimony nonethe-
less is admitted together with all other evidence adduced in the trial because
it helps the trier reach an informed decision. By the same token, to permit
testimony by normative experts is not to deny the average juror's capacity
for moral insight and independent thought-the expert, trained in analysis of
morals, simply improves the likelihood of a correct decision.1 27 Fears that
moralists will usurp the province of the judge and juror, then seem to be a
very speculative basis upon which to exclude normative moralists absent
any kind of judicial experience to validate them.
(b) Creating an Illusion of Infallibility. Another danger of normative
testimony concerns the effect that such testimony might have on society at
large as opposed to the judicial process itself. It is no secret that judges and
jurors can and do make mistakes. This important fact affects the design of
democratic institutions and processes, and tempers the public attitude to-
ward the functioning of the courts. It encourages members of society to
126 Resort to normative experts could conceivably pose other, related problems.
Overreliance, once begun, might expand, and society could begin to entrust all, or
many, difficult decisions to experts. Trials could become longer and more expensive,
and in the long run the idea of the moral equality of all persons could be eroded.
127 In resolving this issue, a court might reason that the familiar practice of turning
to moral advisors when difficult choices arise, see, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 14 (use
of philosophers as moral advisors in New.York hospitals); Advice for the Lonely
Heart, Time, Jan. 19, 1981, at 56, col. I (the advice-to-the-lovelorn columnists,
"Dear Abby" and her sister "Ann Landers," are the most widely syndicated colum-
nists in the western world, appearing in more than 2,000 newspapers), recommends
bringing the practice into the courtroom. Of course, one might question whether the
efficacy of this everyday practice depends on the moral expertise of the advisor. The
value of the practice may stem instead from the feelings it generates-that someone
understands and cares, for instance. The value also may lie in the opportunity to seek
approval and reassurance prior to undertaking an action, or because the exercise of
talking about our decision forces us to examine it more closely. Viewed in this light,
the line between genuine helpfulness in a courtroom setting and mere symbolic value
grows hazy. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (rejecting symbolic value
as a basis for admitting normative testimony).
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scrutinize judicial decisions, and to take legislative or constitutional action
when they disapprove of those decisions. When courts rely on the testimony
of experts in reaching their conclusions, however, the danger of underem-
phasizing the possibility of error may arise. This danger is seemingly present
with any kind of expert testimony, but may be more acute when the prof-
fered expertise is normative rather than, for example, metallurgical.
Again, however, the potential negative effects of expert testimony at a
societal level should not preclude its use in all cases. The present system has
its costs; many judges, jurors, and lawyers are not well versed in moral
analysis, and may make mistakes. 128 Moreover, the spectacle of trained
attorneys arguing opposing views of morality and of judges deciding moral
questions differently in similar cases may prove demoralizing. Experts in
moral philosophy may disagree somewhat less often on moral issues than
nonexperts. Moreover, testimony from normative experts in appropriate
cases can render judicial decisionmaking on ethical issues more open and
explicit than at present. To the extent that courts require that the testimony
actually aid analysis of the issues and "map" adequately onto normal
courtroom functions, 129 the danger of underemphasizing the possibility of
error should be mitigated and the potential gain may outweigh any remaining
costs.
One might of course move from this limited form of approval to the
position that normative experts should testify precisely because such a
practice will foster societal acceptance of judicial decisions. Courts utilize a
number of symbolic or ritualistic devices for the purposes of reassuring
society that they are acting soberly and responsibly. 3 0 Normative testimony
might have value for this reason alone even when it does not significantly aid
a court in resolving moral issues."' From this perspective, traditional
128 Indeed, our legal system recognizes the view that moral mistakes are possible.
Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial segregation in public
schools ruled unconstitutional), with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ("sepa-
rate but equal" upheld). See generally Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518, 523
n.22 (1968) (death-qualified jury unconstitutional; decision made -fully retroac-
tive"); Rachels, supra note 22, at 33 (discussion of "moral systems" changing over
time); Radin, supra note 21, at 1157-59 (views of the death penalty).
129 See infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (proposing standards for admis-
sion of normative testimony).
130 For example, courts conduct proceedings in public, and issue written opinions.
We impanel juries of twelve persons, appoint judges for life, and stand when the
judge enters the courtroom. Judges wear robes; witnesses take oaths. These mea-
sures are aimed, at least in part, at assuring that judicial proceedings are open, fair,
and serious, but may have the effect of clothing the judicial system in a mantle of
infallibility.
131 Anthropologists maintain that every social group subscribes to myths and
rituals that solidify group cohesiveness, and particularly so in times of stress. See,
e.g., M. GLUCKMAN, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBUNAL SOCIETY (1977); V. TURNER,
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evidentiary standards become irrelevant; the normative testimony is justified
not because it actually improves the court's analysis, but because it enables
the court to perform functions such as dissipating the anxiety citizens might
feel if moral certainty were in fact unobtainable, 13 2 or preserving the myth
that moral certainty is discernible by some even if it is beyond the grasp of
most.133 Participants in the courtroom drama-the judge, the parties, and
the experts themselves-would perhaps not consciously and openly justify
resort to moral experts on these grounds. Nevertheless, such motivations
may sometimes lie behind decisions to offer or admit expert testimony.
The implications of permitting expert testimony solely on the basis of its
symbolic value are troubling, however. An examination of the role of myths
in our society illustrates the potential hazards. As a society, we hold a large
number of "substantive" myths-for example, that the United States is a
more or less pure democracy, that individual industry produces individual
success, and that free market capitalism is superior to socialism' 34-but
THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURAL AND ANTI-STRUCTURAL (1977); G. VANN,
MYTH, SYMBOL AND REVELATION (1962). Plato advocated myths as social control
devices, see PLATO, supra note 37, at 376e-383c, 414b-415d, as did Machiavelli, see
N. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 125, and at least one classical utilitarian writer, see
H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 489, 489-92 (7th ed. 1907) (principle of utility
best served if public kept ignorant of it). In our day, Calabresi speaks of resolving
"tragic choices" to preserve the myth that life is a pearl beyond price. See
G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); see also W. NOLEN, A SUR-
GEON'S WORLD 161 (1972) (doctors cultivate a bedside manner to create an outward
impression of confidence, and prescribe placebos knowing they will work only if the
patient believes they will). In this sense, normative testimony might be useful to
improve a court's credibility, thereby enhancing its effectiveness as a social institu-
tion.
132 Compare A. CAMUS, THE STRANGER (1946) (existential anxiety over moral
ambiguities in modern fife), with PLATO, supra note 37, at 414b-415d (use of anxiety-
allaying myths in ideal republic to justify allocation of roles to citizenry). See
generally R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 147 ("progress ... is moral progress, and
though history may show how difficult it is to decide where moral progress lies . . . it
cannot follow . . . that those who govern us have no responsibility to face that
decision"), 186 (moral truths cannot be proved, but can be "taken seriously");
Yesley, supra note 2, at 1458 (National Commission created in part because of
difficulty in achieving agreement on matters that affect " 'the sensibilities and the
ethics of the people of this country' ") (quoting 119 CONG. REC. 29,219, 29,228
(1973) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)).
13 Cf. PLATO, supra note 37 (complex scheme of government for ideal state, in
which individuals with moral insight would be placed in charge, while others with less
moral knowledge would occupy subordinate positions); Veatch, supra note 15 (dis-
cussing hazy role of court-ordered "ethics" committees in hospitals); Yesley, supra
note 2, at 1452, 1457 (discussing use of ethics advisory commissions to achieve moral
consensus otherwise unobtainable by citizenry or legislature).
131 Cf. H. LONDON & A. WEEKS, MYTHS THAT RULE AMERICA (1980) (arguing
that United States has substantive myths about greatness, power, and mission, but
needs even more).
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relatively few "procedural" ones. Because substantive myths are held
overtly, they are subject to analysis, challenge, dissent, and abandonment if
found pernicious. Procedural myths, however, are less visible than substan-
tive myths and therefore less easily corrected. 3 ' Procedure is translucent, if
not transparent. Everyone cares about substantive values, but few persons,
other than lawyers and political scientists, concern themselves with the
process by which values are formed.' 3 6 The potential for uncritical public
acquiescence to judicial choices therefore increases when we build new
myths into our judicial procedures, and especially so when those additions
profoundly affect the decisions reached in novel cases of great social impor-
tance. Hence, the danger that underarticulated or perhaps unconscious
symbolic or ritualistic motivations lie in the background should temper
decisions to admit normative testimony even when its use seems warranted
under standard rules of evidence law.
B. The When, Why, and How of Normative Testimony: A Theoretical
Model
Under what circumstances, then, should courts permit testimony by
moralists on matters of normative ethics? This question to some extent
resists before-the-fact analysis, for different types of problems attend the
various uses of normative testimony. Yet the case for admission is theoreti-
cally strongest when three basic indicia of helpfulness and reliability are
present. These concern the nature of the case, the source of the testimony,
and the manner in which the witness interacts with the judicial process.
A court considering whether to permit normative ethical testimony should
initially assess the potential helpfulness of the testimony in the particular
case;I3 7 normative testimony has no place in the courtroom unless it is likely
to provide genuine and significant help in resolving a moral dilemma. If
ethical considerations are not relevant at all, or if the issues are not
sufficiently difficult to require the analysis of an expert moralist, the court
should bar the witness as a matter of evidence law. By contrast, when the
"I- In a trial setting, the adversary system tends to protect against excessive
mythmaking of the substantive variety. When one side seeks to establish a proposi-
tion by introducing the testimony of any expert, the other side can rebut by introduc-
ing an expert who will testify to the opposite proposition. The adversary system
would seemingly provide little built-in protection, however, against the procedural
version of this myth-that a colloquy between expert moralists will produce a better
decision than one rendered by a judge or jury.
136 Cf. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 102 ("Lawyers are experts on process writ small,
the processes by which facts are found and contending parties are allowed to present
their claims. And to a degree they are experts on the process writ larger, the
processes by which issues of public policy are fairly determined .... ) (emphasis
omitted).
137 See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text (discussion of the helpfulness
standard used by courts to determine whether or not to admit expert testimony).
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issues'are novel, difficult, and normative in nature, testimony by individuals
with normative expertise can supplement the judge's and jurors' general
understanding, and thus facilitate principled decisionmaking. 138
Analysis under the helpfulness standard, however, cannot end the inquiry.
In light of the special problems associated with normative testimony, courts
should require additional safeguards. Specifically, to avoid problems of
relativism, 3 9 courts should demand that any expert who testifies represent a
school of thought that meets certain standards of adequacy, including:
logical consistency, impartiality, concern for factual evidence and reasoned
analysis, consonance with the "considered moral judgments" of persons in
our society, and consonance with norms already incorporated into law., 40 A
witness meeting these requirements will be likely to share many of the
court's underlying ethical assumptions, and should be able to support opin-
ions that go beyond settled law with reasons that are open to analysis and
criticism through cross-examination.
14 1
Finally, a decision to admit normative testimony should require a court's
judgment that the testimony will "map" adequately onto existing courtroom
functions and will not subvert judicial roles. 142 Problems of mapping might
arise if the witness met the aforementioned criteria but refused to take the
assignment seriously, believed that ethical knowledge is impossible or that
the Good is ineffable, or viewed moral knowledge as a matter of intuition and
138 For example, normative ethical testimony might have its greatest value in cases
involving bioethical dilemmas. See supra note 10. Such cases often present un-
precedented fact patterns, and the expert's ethical perspective can help the court
examine explicitly the moral concerns implicated by its judgment.
'39 See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
140 These criteria are adopted from M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 78.
141 Shapiro and Spece address the concern that requiring consonance with consid-
ered moral judgments and norms incorporated in law fails to provide a logically
compelling justification for any moral assertion, and thus, merely enforces a form of
reactionary conventionalism:
In talking about shared judgments as forming the data (the 'facts') upon which
moral philosophy is built, are we not simply saying that morality is after all a
kind of social convention? The answer to this worry ... is the following: That
morality is conventional in this sense is a harmless kind of conventionality, one
which does not threaten the rational credibility of moral philosophy, because this
kind of conventionality is to be found in all rational areas of human discourse-
even empirical science. Empirical science could not proceed, for example, if it
were not agreed by all participants in scientific discussion that certain things had
to be accepted as important-e.g., observation, predictability, and noncircular-
ity. For this is simply the banality that rational discussion between two persons
cannot proceed if those persons agree on nothing .... Thus, if morality turns out
to be relative or conventional only in some sense in which science is also relative
or conventional, the rational attack on morality is dissipated.
M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 79 (quoting J. Murphy, The Possibility of
Moral Philosophy 23-24 (unpublished essay) (emphasis in original)).
142 See supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
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consequently beyond cross-examination. Normative testimony originating
from religious doctrine might also fail to map adequately because it would
raise Establishment Clause problems. 143 When these problems arise, courts
should exclude the testimony. To further guard against subversion dangers,
courts in each case should assess the relative merits of court appointed
experts and adversarial presentation, 144 and should decline to hear testi-
mony in areas characterized by a complete lack of moral consensus.
These proposed criteria can help minimize the danger that normative
expert testimony will supplant rather than supplement moral analysis by
courts. The theoretical requirements are stringent, however, and may be
difficult to meet in practice. Even so, we do not mean to suggest that any
testimony satisfying the standards proposed here will be free of all the
problems associated with normative expert testimony; we doubt that any
test could provide such assurance. These criteria merely represent a first
step toward analysis of the use of normative testimony. But they can be
applied constructively to evaluate leading schools of ethical thought to
determine which might qualify to give normative testimony.
C. Particular Schools of Ethical Thought as Sources of Normative
Testimony
Philosophers from a number of schools of thought would be poor candi-
dates for service as normative experts under any circumstances. Some
would not qualify because they would reject the possibility of such tes-
timony, while others would fail because of something intrinsic to their
ethical system. Thus, a court would reject testimony from a present-day
Sophist-if one exists-because the witness' position would not be impartial
and would lack consonance with the considered moral judgments of our
society. 14 For the same reasons, courts should reject the unadorned self-
143 See infra notes 227-39 and accompanying text.
141 Testimony from appointed experts may well prove attractive to courts wishing
to hear moral or ethical testimony on difficult issues, but desiring to avoid unseemly
"battles of the experts." On the other hand, a court's stamp of approval might pose
heightened risks of paralyzing judge and jury so that they cease to perform an
independent function. Cf. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 330-33, 438 P.2d 33,
40-41, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 504-05 (1968) (introduction of expert mathematical tes-
timony relating to probability theory in criminal case constitutes prejudicial error;
jurors are undoubtedly impressed by the "mystique" of such evidence and accord it
disproportionate weight). Whenever this danger seems acute, it might be advisable to
have moral experts appear in adversarial roles.
145 The Sophists were early Greek philosophers who flourished about 450-400 B.C.
They were professional teachers of virtue and moral wisdom. See, e.g., 3 W. GUTH-
RIE, A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 255-56 (1975); H. SIDGWICK, OUTLINES OF
THE HISTORY OF ETHICS 17-22 (4th ed. 1896); see also B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 59-63, 73-82 (1945). Like a number of today's professional
advice givers, they believed that the skill of conducting oneself properly could be
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interest of Machiavellian moral philosophy 146 or the anarchistic ethical view
of Nietzsche 147 as sources of ethical expertise. Socratics, like other moral
skeptics, might offer helpful metaethical analysis, but probably would refuse
to testify on normative matters because they do not believe that human
knowledge on morals represents more than speculation and conjecture. 148
taught. Nonetheless, Sophists would provide little help to courts on normative
matters since their teaching seems to have been almost entirely prudential in its
concerns with helping the student succeed in the practical affairs of life. See 3 W.
GUTHRIE, supra, at 255-56. Indeed, according to one commentator, the Sophists'
ability to attract clients was due to their insistence that self-interest and virtue
coincide. H. SIDGWICK, supra, at 255-56; see also PLATO, THE PROTAGORAS 328b
(W. Guthrie trans. 1957) (attributing to Protagoras the observation that Sophists
viewed the willingness of their pupils to pay as the best evidence of their competence
as teachers of virtue).
146 See N. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 125 (ethical system in which the end-
consolidation of the monarch's power-justifies the means used to achieve it).
147 See F. NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL §§ 60-65, at 203-17 (M. Cowan
trans. 1955) [hereinafter cited as "F. NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL"];
F. NIETZSCHE, ON A GENEALOGY OF MORALS (W. Kaufmann trans. 1969) [herein-
after cited as "F. NIETZSCHE, GENEALOGY"]; F. NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER
509-10 (W. Kaufmann & R. Halligdale trans. 1967) [hereinafter cited as "F.
NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER"]. See generally Kaufmann, Friedrich Nietzsche, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 504, 511-12 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). Nietzsche be-
lieved that life has no meaning other than "the meaning that man gives [it]" and that
"the aims of most men have no surpassing dignity." Kaufmann, supra, at 512. He
accordingly developed the concept of Ubermensch-the overman or superman-who
is guided by neither of the predominant moralities, "master morality" and "slave
morality," id.; F. NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, supra, at 203-17, and who
instead creates his own rules of conduct, Kaufmann, supra, at 511-12; F.
NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER, supra, at 510. Nietzschean moral philosophy thus
rejects the possibility of ethical norms grounded in an ethical system. On this view,
normative testimony would never be impartial, and would not likely be in accord with
the considered moral views of persons in our society or the norms already enshrined
in our legal system.
"I See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (evidentiary rules barring tes-
timony on subjects as to which even the best experts are not competent to form
opinions). Socrates believed that moral expertise was in theory transmissible, and
hence, perhaps, communicable to a court. However, he also believed that the only
way to impart such instruction was for the listener or student to draw conclusions
independently through a process of dialectical examination of prior beliefs, see
PLATO, APOLOGY 21b-d, reprinted in THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 45, 50-51 (Pen-
guin ed. H. Tredinnick trans. 1969) [hereinafter cited as "PLATO, APOLOGY"];
H. SIDGWICK, supra note 145, at 25, and thought it useless simply to tell another how
to live or that a given thing or course of conduct was right or wrong, see Vlastos, The
Paradox of Socrates, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES I (G. Vlastos ed. 1971). The
Dialogues thus indicate that even the best Socratic philosophers might be unable to
convey moral wisdom to others, for in many cases, reflection and discussion can do
no more than reveal the inconsistencies in our moral beliefs and actions. Id. In fact,
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Radical existentialists would pose problems because they believe that there
are no right and wrong answers, and that each individual must choose what
is "right" for himself or herself. 149 Similar concerns would justify excluding
ethical egoists in the tradition of Hobbes.15 0 This is not to say that members
of these schools might never enter the trial process; to the contrary, courts
might seek their aid in assessing the qualifications or credibility of other
normative witnesses on cross-examination. 5 ' Yet philosophers who deny
Socrates was openly contemptuous of the Sophists for their claim to be able to teach
virtue, and made no stronger claim for himself than that he knew how ignorant he
was. PLATO, APOLOGY, supra, at 20b-c.
Socrates was not a complete moral skeptic, however. He held that moral expertise
could exist in the form of knowledge of the Good-an awareness which gives the
holder an infallible capacity to judge and act rightly, see Plato, supra note 37, at
352b-356c (the Protagoras); Santas, Plato's Protagoras and Explanations of Weak-
ness, 75 PHIL. REV. 3, 4-20 (1966), but which is insuperably difficult to attain.
Moreover, in his actions, Socrates was not a moral skeptic. He was prepared to make
moral choices, often unorthodox ones, and to adhere to them even at great personal
cost. See generally PLATO, THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES (H. Tredennick trans.
1969) [hereinafter cited as "PLATO, LAST DAYS"]. Yet despite these attributes, the
skepticism of Socratic moral philosophy would make a philosopher in the tradition of
Socrates an unlikely candidate for courtroom testimony in the normative mode.
149 See, e.g., A. CAMUS, supra note 132; S. KIERKEGAARD, EITHER-OR
(W. Lowrie trans. 1971) (1st ed. Copenhagen 1843) [hereinafter cited as "S. KIER-
KEGAARD, EITHER-OR"]; S. KIERKEGAARD, THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH (H. Hong
& E. Hong trans. 1980) (1st ed. Copenhagen 1849) [hereinafter cited as "S. KIER-
KEGAARD, SICKNESS UNTO DEATH"].
150 Hobbes, a moral relativist, embraced an egoistic psychology that reduced all
human motives to the pursuit of pleasure and the preservation of self. To Hobbes,
"good" was simply a name individuals assigned objects to which they happened to be
drawn by inclination or appetite. See J. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN Pt. I (M. Oakeshott ed.
1962) (1st ed. London 1651); SCHLICK, PROBLEMS OF ETHICS 162-65 (D. Rynin trans.
1939); Hampshire, Hobbes, in THE AGE OF REASON 34-37 (S. Hampshire ed. 1956).
Hobbesian moral philosophy thus would be of little use in the trial process since it lacks
completeness, impartiality, and consonance with the considered moral judgments of
contemporary society.
"I' That our legal system holds certain moral beliefs, supra notes 1-2 and ac-
companying text, does not warrant rejecting all testimony from moral philosophers
who reject some, or even all, of these beliefs. The expert testifying in the primary mode is
likely to be going beyond the settled bounds of existing law. See Hart, 29 Conn. Supp. at
368, 289 A. 2d at 386. Although a court may not be free to reject the moral principles built
into that law, it should certainly considerthe criticisms and attacks of moral skeptics in
deciding whether or not to add to the edifice on the advice of moral nonskeptics. To this
end, skeptical moralists might aid courts by rebutting the testimony of, or commenting
on the qualifications of, other moralists.
Although moralists have not previously served this secondary function, the prac-
tice would probably develop if the use of normative experts were to become wide-
spread. In light of the unsettled questions in this area, courts should be liberal in
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the possibility of reaching "morally sound decisions" reject the fundamen-
tal premises of courts in cases like Hart, 152 and thus can provide little
primary assistance.
Primary assistance might come, however, from members of other schools
of thought. Moralists from these schools hold views that are generally
consonant with both the considered moral judgments of persons in our
society and moral norms incorporated into law, and that, subject to qualifica-
tion, seem transmissible in court. The expert moralists most likely to satisfy
this standard would seem to be members of the utilitarian school of ethics,
deontologists of various types, moral intuitionists, and representatives from
the various religious traditions.' 53 The analysis of these and other schools
set forth below illustrates how normative experts might play a role in the trial
process.
1. Utilitarian Theories
Many experts who could helpfully testify on matters of normative ethics
would be likely to subscribe to a version of utilitarianism,1 4 perhaps the
leading secular ethical theory in the western world today. Utilitarians judge
actions by their consequences, but differ in certain respects. For example,
one of the school's leading historical exponents, John Stuart Mill, espoused
a theory of "act utilitarianism," under which an act's rightness depends on
whether it produces a greater balance of pleasure over pain for all sentient
creatures throughout all future time than any other alternative available to
the agent.' 5 Mill's focus on particular acts contrasts with the view of rule
admitting such testimony. Of course, questions concerning the helpfulness of sec-
ondary testimony will not arise in the absence of a decision to admit normative
testimony of a primary type. This is the more central, and more difficult, question.
152 See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
3 This list is not exhaustive, for courts should be willing to hear normative
testimony from members of any school of thought meeting the proposed require-
ments. These well-known schools are merely offered as examples.
154 For general discussions of utilitarianism, see J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM
(Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1957) (1st complete ed. London 1863); Smart, An Outline of a
System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3 (J. Smart &
B. Williams eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as "Smart, An Outline"]; Smart,
Utilitarianism, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 206 (P. Edwards ed. 1967) [here-
inafter cited as "+Smart, Utilitarianism'].
155 J.S. MILL, supra note 154, ch. II ("What Utilitarianism Is"). But see Urmson,
The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill, in THEORIES OF ETHICS 128
(P. Foote ed. 1967) (arguing that Mill should be classified as a rule utilitarian). Mill's
brand of utilitarianism is sometimes referred to as "universalistic hedonistic act
utilitarianism." The view is universalistic because it considers irrelevant who will
experience the pleasure or pain produced, whereas an egoistic utilitarian focuses on
future pleasure and pain of the agent. It is hedonistic because, in evaluating the
consequences of acts, it assumes that the only thing valuable in itself is experiential
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utilitarians, who emphasize evaluation of general rules of action. In the
century since Mill, major utilitarian philosophers, such as Sidgwick,
5 6
Moore, I5 7 Nowell-Smith, 58 Smart,' 59 and Rawls 160 have adopted one or the
other view, but retained a common approach to the analysis of moral
problems.
Normative ethical testimony from a qualified act or rule utilitarian would
seem to meet evidentiary requirements in a number of situations. In a case
like Hart, for example, a court could deem the consequences of alternative
courses of action relevant to the .decision to approve or disapprove the
transplant, and might call upon a utilitarian to provide reasoned, normative
analysis. 6 1 A utilitarian's cause and effect calculations might require con-
pleasure, and that anything else is of value only to the extent that it produces
pleasure. An idealistic utilitarian, by contrast, acknowledges the intrinsic value of
things other than pleasure, such as beauty, knowledge, human dignity, equality, or
fairness.
Bentham was also an act utilitarian.
156 H. SIDGWICK, supra note 131. Sidgwick was a universalistic hedonistic utili-
tarian. Smart, Utilitarianism, supra note 154, at 208.
157 G. MOORE, supra note 18. Moore was an idealistic universalistic utilitarian.
Smart, An Outline, supra note 154, at 12-13; Smart, Utilitarianism, supra note 154, at
208.
158 P. NOWELL-SMITH, supra note 16. Nowell-Smith is a rule utilitarian. Smart,
Utilitarianism, supra note 154, at 208.
'19 See Smart, An Outline, supra note 154; Smart, Utilitarianism, supra note 154.
160 Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). Rawls has been
classified as a rule utilitarian. Smart, Utilitarianism, supra note 154, at 208. In his
later Theory of Justice, however, Rawls argues against utilitarian normative theories
and offers what he views as a Kantian, contractarian foundation for a liberal demo-
cratic theory of justice. See J. RAWLS, supra note 1; see also Lyons, Rawls Versus
Utilitarianism, 69 J. PHIL. 535 (1972); Teitelman, The Limits of Individualism, 69 J.
PHIL. 545 (1972); (j Rawls, Reply to Lyons and Teitelman, 69 J. PHIL. 556 (1972).
161 Some utilitarians, including Hume, believe that human beings are motivated to
act by a natural spirit of benevolence. See D. HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE,
bk. 3, pt. I, § I, at 468-69 (Selby-Bigge ed. 1978) (1st ed. London 1739);
H. SIDGWICK, supra note 145, at 204-18. Since human motivation contains this
"fellow feeling with the happiness and misery of others," H. SIDGW!CK, supra note
145, at 207, much human happiness and unhappiness will be vicarious, causing the
calculation of consequences to become exceedingly complex. Hume observed, for
instance, that it makes us happy to see a worthy person rewarded, or an unworthy
person punished. In contrast, it makes us unhappy to see an innocent person pun-
ished, or to see the evil person prosper. The utilitarian thus cannot stop his or her
analysis at the level of the individual who is rewarded or punished; he or she must
consider all of the secondary or vicarious happiness or sorrow that an action will
produce. Hume's analysis would also require taking into account tertiary pleasures
and sorrows-"I'm glad you are glad he is being punished"; "I wish you did not have
to know that those people are so miserable"--and so on.
The fact that secondary concerns play an important role in cases like Hart provides
further support for calling upon expert utilitarian analysis. Thus, a court might
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sultation with a second expert from another discipline-sociology, econom-
ics, physics-to support the assertion that certain effects are in fact likely to
result, but would nonetheless satisfy the current helpfulness test of evidence
law. 16 2 Utilitarianism also should satisfy the proposed tests of adequacy as
an ethical system since its method of analysis is internally consistent, rea-
soned, impartial, and seemingly consonant with the considered moral judg-
ment of many members of our society. 63 As a largely secular school of
ethical thought, moreover, it poses no problem of establishment of religion.
In practice, both normative and metaethical testimony from utilitarian
ethicists would map adequately onto a number of judicial functions. Indeed,
one school of legal analysis-the law-and-economics school-holds that
most if not all legal rules should promote overall need-satisfaction, plainly a
type of utilitarian analysis. 64 Unlike members of certain skeptical schools,
utilitarian ethicists probably would accept the challenge to provide assis-
tance to courts and would approach the task with the requisite seriousness
and sense of common venture, although rule utilitarians might have reserva-
tions about the practice in general. These moralists might feel obliged to
consider not only the utility of permitting expert testimony in particular
cases, but also whether the short- and long-term effects of resorting to such
testimony promise a net gain. 65 For example, an expert's correct judgment
instruct the expert to consider a variety of concerns-How will the healthy child feel
years from now if the transplant is performed successfully? Performed unsuccess-
fully? How will the parents feel about having brought about these feelings in the
donor?-in assessing the morality of various primary alternatives.
162 The helpfulness test also would permit metaethical analysis by utilitarian
experts, such as sorting out the general rules which the facts of the case bring into
conflict. Indeed, a rule utilitarian would submit that resolution of moral dilemmas
requires attaching appropriate priorities to the many rules that bear on the case, and
that this is impossible without first identifying the rules.
163 Ordinary observation demonstrates that many persons believe that the good or
bad consequences of actions are important considerations in determining their right-
ness or wrongness. For example, most of us would severely criticize a parent who
refused to permit a sick child to receive lifesaving medical treatment when the
consequence of refusal would be the child's death. Some writers, however, have
argued that to equate moral goodness or rightness with the consequences of actions is
at odds with certain commonly held and deeply felt moral ideas. See H. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 62-70 (1968) (arguing that notions of fairness
and justice limit what punishment may be exacted to promote utilitarian goals).
164 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1970); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
ECON. 1 (1960).
165 The rule utilitarian might agree that caclulations of the good or evil effects
likely to result from certain judicial decisions are appropriately consigned to experts,
but nevertheless find that such consignment is unacceptable because, as a practice,
it produces too many evil results. See H. SIDGWICK, supra note 131, at 489-92
(utilitarianism best served by keeping public ignorant of it). But see Williams, A
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may provoke such social consternation that the pain produced outweighs the
benefit of a morally correct judgment. Further, the moralist might be con-
cerned that if ethical testimony becomes accepted and routinely relied on, it
could conceivably erode individuals' inclinations to decide for themselves
on moral questions.
Act utilitarians will insist upon addressing these issues on a case-by-case
basis. In some trials, the dangers of expert testimony will seem small and the
gains great. Under these conditions, the principle of utility will be served by
allowing the moral expert to testify. The attitude of a rule utilitarian to the
prospect of moral expert testimony seems less certain. Presumably, it would
take the form of a rule justified by the probability that such testimony would
over the long run produce a greater balance of pleasure over pain than would
adherence to any alternative rule. The contours of any such rule are unclear.
2. Deontological Ethics
Deontologists are ethical theorists who believe, with Kant, that the impor-
tant element in moral conduct is to conform one's actions to duty. 66 Adher-
ence to duty supersedes all other goals, such as securing happiness or any
other kind of consequence, or acting on the basis of any type of motive,
whether egoistic or altruistic. As an illustration, Kant maintained that it
would be wrong to make a false promise even if by so doing one could save
one's own life.1 67 Kant was also a rationalist who believed that duty in any
given situation could be deduced, through practical reason, from fundamen-
tal principles that were knowable independently of experience. Reflection,
according to Kant, informs us "with unwavering certainty that duty is
distinct from pleasure .... that moral virtue .. is the supreme good .... and
that moral worth is not measured either by the consequences of a person's
actions or by his natural benevolence, but by the agent's intention to obey
moral laws."' 68 From these self-evident truths, the single most fundamental
moral principle-the categorical imperative16 9 -could be deduced. Armed
Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 77, 123-24 (J.
Smart & B. Williams eds. 1973) (criticizing lack of openness between ruler and
ruled).
166 For excellent discussions of deontological ethics, see, e.g., W. FRANKENA,
ETHICS 14-15 (2d ed. 1973); H. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (1948);
B. RUSSELL, supra note 145, at 710-12; Olson, Deontological Ethics, in 2 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 343 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). For examples of moral duties that
flow from the adoption of the categorical imperative, see I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 37-47 (T. Abbott trans. 1949) (ist ed.
Riga 1785).
167 1. KANT, supra note 166, at 37-47.
168 Abelson, History of Ethics, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 81, 95
(P. Edwards ed. 1967); see I. KANT, supra note 166, at 11-13, 20, 36-49 (categorical
imperative).
169 I. KANT, supra note 166, at 36-49.
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with these principles, a rational being could then judge any particular action
against unvarying standards.
Contemporary deontologists include followers of Kant, as well as a num-
ber of religious moralists. 170 Like utilitarians, these deontologists subscribe
to both act and rule theories.17 1 Act deontologists hold that specific acts or
situations are governed by duty-based imperatives, while rule deontologists
hold that rules apply to classes of action or situation. Examples of act
deontological systems are Joseph Fletcher's Situation Ethics17 2 and various
"natural law" theories. 173 Examples of rule deontological systems are
Kant's work, that of W.D. Ross, 174 and the Ten Commandments. 75 The
later work of the contemporary legal philosopher, John Rawls, is sometimes
classified as rule deontological.
176
An examination of major deontological systems indicates that many could
fulfill the evidentiary requirements for expert testimony. Deontological tes-
timony could aid a court confronted by issues of distributive justice, for
example.177 Questions of entitlement, discrimination, "reverse descrimina-
tion," and conflicts among major ordering principles are also particularly
amenable to deontological analysis, and resort to deontologists might be
170 See, e.g., J. CALVIN, ON THE CHRISTIAN FAITH (J. McNeil ed. 1957) [here-
inafter cited as -J. CALVIN, CHRISTIAN FAITH"]; J. CALVIN, SERMONS ON THE TEN
COMMANDMENTS (B. Farley ed. 1980) (1st ed. London 1581) [hereinafter cited as "J.
CALVIN, SERMONS"]; J. KNOX, WORKS OF JOHN KNOX (D. Laing ed. 1895). Not all
religious moralists are deontologists in ethics, however. Some are radical existen-
tialists who emphasize the role of personal choice, see, e.g., M. BUBER, BETWEEN
MAN AND MAN (R. Smith trans. 1965); S. KIERKEGAARD, EITHER-OR, supra note
149, while others fit more squarely within the utilitarian tradition of western moral
thought, see, e.g., R. NIEBUHR, AN INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1935)
[hereinafter cited as "R. NIEBUHR, INTERPRETATION"]; R. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN
AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS (1932) [hereinafter cited
as "R. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN"].
71 See, e.g., T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 10, at 22-41; M. SHA-
PIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 81.
172 J. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS (1962).
173 For discussion of natural law theories, see H. HART, CONCEPT, supra note 1, at
182; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 595 (1958) (the "Hart-Fuller" debate). Natural law theorists hold, generally,
that ethical relations should inform legal obligations and that norms of both types can
be discerned by reason from mankind's "inherent nature," see M. SHAPIRO &
R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 90.
174 See W. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930).
'71 See Exodus 20:3-17.
176 See M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 88; Murphy, Rights and
Borderline Cases, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 228, 232-33 (1977) (discussing Rawls' Theory of
Justice).
177 See Hart, 29 Conn. Supp. at 368, 289 A.2d at 386.
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helpful when the issue before the court is or could be framed in those
terms. 7 8 Much deontological testimony would seem capable of critical
evaluation by the court; most deontological views are relatively complete
and concerned with factual evidence and reasoned analysis. Moreover, most
major deontological systems are tightly organized, internally consistent,
hierarchically arranged sets of belief that pose few problems of consistency
or impartiality. Finally, since many of us are deontologists in our view of
right and wrong' 79-at least in certain areas-deontological ethics could
meet the standard of consonance with the considered judgments of persons
in our society. 18 0 In general, then, deontological testimony would satisfy the
requirements of a minimally adequate ethical system.
Deontological views vary, however, and some would map onto courtroom
functions more effectively than others. Secular systems of rule deontological
ethics would appear to map adequately, although some deontologists, in-
cluding Kant and certain moral intuitionists, might have reservations about
their own testimony. Kant, for example, held that all persons are theoreti-
cally capable of knowing the fundamental principles from which the rules of
right conduct are to be deduced, as well as being capable of deducing those
rules and conforming their conduct to them. 18' Yet Kant and other deon-
tologists recognize that deducing rules is not a simple matter, and most
believe that actual conformity of conduct to duty is difficult because of the
passion and temptation that the individual must overcome. 182 Told that their
testimony need only be helpful rather than conclusive, and that the court
178 In appropriate cases, a deontologist might show that the issue before the court
can in fact be framed in such terms, or deduce ethical conclusions from prima facie
obligations or various categorical or conditional imperatives. Metaethical testimony
of this nature would meet the helpfulness standard. See supra notes 74-79 and
accompanying text.
179 Everyday observation discloses that many persons feel we should obey the law
even if there is no chance of being caught; that promises should be kept even if this
entails pain or effort; and that property, organs, and bodily parts should not be taken
from one person for the benefit of another even if the transfer results in a net gain in
utility. Cf. Brennan & Delgado, Death: Multiple Definitions or a Single Standard? 54
S. CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1351-53 (1981) (proposing that multiple definitions of death, by
specifying different standards for different purposes permit courts to accommodate a
broader range of interests than is possible under a single standard).
180 Of course, a particular deontologist might hold that we are duty-bound to obey
rules that seriously contravene society's considered moral judgments or the moral
values incorporated in existing law. A white supremacist who advocates racism
based on a perceived collection of moral duties-for example, to further the welfare
of one's own race, to hinder the advancement of persons of other races, and to treat
dark skin as evidence of sinfulness and inferiority-would present such a case. Under
these circumstances, courts must assure that a genuine consonance exists between
the views of the expert and the considered moral judgments of society.
' See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
182 1. KANT, supra note 166, at 40-41, 45-48.
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remains free to draw its own conclusions, most rule deontologists would
probably agree to testify.
Other deontological views might encounter more substantial obstacles.
Religious deontologists who testify purely from scriptural or other religious
sources might violate the first amendment's prohibition against establish-
ment of religion and thus fail to qualify. 183 Act deontologists, who evaluate
the goodness or rightness of acts and rules in particular settings, also pose
special problems. Although their testimony might "map" adequately in
connection with bioethical dilemmas that present unusual, nonrecurring fact
settings calling for unique value judgments, 184 the act deontologist's notion
of rules and norms tailored to each case might undermine the stability of
expectations that the legal system demands. Indeed, it might be impossible
to cross-examine an expert who purports to find a unique ethical obligation
in every new situation. A judge or juror might have difficulty evaluating the
credibility of such testimony, or understanding why it is more persuasive
than testimony that produces a diametrically opposite recommendation. For
these reasons, a court might find the testimony of an act deontologist
unacceptable and exercise its discretion to exclude it.
3. Moral Intuitionism
Moral intuitionists, although not in agreement on all questions, hold in one
form or another that morality is accessible to all through a form of insight or
moral sense.' 85 Locke, 8 6 Clarke, 8 7 and Hobbes, 8 8 for example, believed
1113 For a discussion of establishment of religion problems inherent in certain forms
of normative testimony, see infra notes 227-39 and accompanying text.
'84 See M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 47, at 85.
185 The earliest-and perhaps greatest-moral intuitionist, Plato, is omitted from
textual discussion because relatively few contemporary moral philosophers would
describe themselves as Platonists. Nevertheless, many are in his debt. See generally
A. WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 63 (1929) (western philosophy consists of"a
series of footnotes to Plato").
Plato's moral philosophy is difficult to classify. See J.S. MILL, supra note 154, ch.
II (claiming Plato as the world's first utilitarian). He is perhaps best known for his
view that the ideal government would be one governed by "philosopher kings," see
PLATO, supra note 37, at 519e-541b, and in The Republic he offered a theory of
human virtue and its relation to political justice that purports to explain what moral
expertise is, how it is fostered, how to tell whether someone has it, and why it is
important for both persons and political institutions to be guided by it. In formulating
this theory, Plato drew a sharp distinction between genuine knowledge, or wisdom,
and mere opinion-regardless of the truth of the opinion. He maintained that the best
kind of ruler was one with genuine knowledge of the Good, and that such a person
could not help but conduct both personal and public affairs in perfect accord with
principles of right conduct. Plato also argued that the vast majority of people,
although unable to achieve true moral wisdom, might nonetheless be guided by these
principles of right conduct, adherence to which would produce happiness for the
individual and harmony, prosperity, and stability for the state and its citizens. See id.
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in the possibility of deducing morality from fundamental principles.8 9
Hobbes derived his principles from psychology and metaethics, 190 while
Locke and Clarke thought morality was self-evident.191 Other intuitionists,
such as Shaftesbury, Hume, and Butler, believed that all persons possess a
special faculty for discerning right from wrong, 19 2 whether in the form of a
"moral sense"-a natural inclination toward the pursuit of social good' 93 -
Plato was convinced, as indicated by his own efforts to reform the rulers of
Syracuse through moral counsel, that the philosopher had an important contribution
to make even short of his role in the ideal republic. He describes himself as going to
Syracuse with the hope that "if anyone were ever to attempt to realize my ideals in
regard to laws and government, now was the time for the trial. If I were to convince
but one man, that in itself would assure complete success." PLATO, Seventh Letter,
in THIRTEEN EPISTLES OF PLATO 328b-c (L. Post trans. 1925). Such a claim bespeaks
a very strong faith indeed in the power and value of moral knowledge.
Given this faith, it is clear that Plato would fully approve the idea of moralists as
expert witnesses. In Plato's view, achieving reliable knowledge on difficult questions
of morality requires expertise. See generally PLATO, supra note 37. Plato would
concede that lay persons might have the capacity to form opinions on normative
questions so long as the questions are not too far afield from the kinds of practical
decisions they must handle on a day-to-day basis, and would further insist that such
lay opinions will be fairly accurate and reliable if the society as a whole is stable and
well-regulated, and if the populace has proper habits of thought and conduct. Id. at
419c-445e. Yet Plato would hold that lay opinions on normative questions are worth-
less if the questions presented require difficult balancing of competing principles, or if
the society has not successfully instilled proper values and discipline into its citizens.
The Platonic account also implies that only the moral philosopher can speak with
assurance on metaethical questions. See id. at 580b-583a. In all of this, Plato is quite
clear as to what constitutes moral expertise-it requires a very special combination
of natural talent, careful nurturing, good physical and mental health, and years of
intensive training in many fields of study. Id. at 521d-540c.
186 For a discussion of Locke's views on morals, see H. SIDGWICK, OUTLINES OF
THE HISTORY OF ETHICS 175-78 (6th ed. 1931).
187 See H. SIDGWICK, supra note 145, at 179-84; Sprague, Samuel Clark, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 118 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
188 See supra note 150.
189 See H. SIDGWICK, supra note 145, at 175-84; Sprague, supra note 187, at
119-20; supra note 150.
190 See supra note 150.
191 See Sprague, supra note 187, at 119. Clark hoped, by analogizing morality to
mathematical systems, to put conventional Christian morality on as firm a footing as
that of Newtonian science, and to defeat Hobbesian moral relativism. Id. at 118-20;
see also H. SIDGWICK, supra note 145, at 177, 184.
192 See J. BUTLER, Three Sermons on Human Nature, in BUTLER'S FIFTEEN
SERMONS 117 (T. Roberts ed. 1970); D. HUME, supra note 164, at 468-69; Sprague,
Joseph Butler, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 432 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
193 See generally Shaftesbury, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, in 1 BRITISH
MORALISTS 3 (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1897).
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or a Creator-designed conscience.1 94 Most intuitionists have developed
elaborate ethical systems by deriving duties such as altruism from basic
principles, which, in turn, are supplied by our moral sense.
In theory at least, moral intuitionists could satisfy the helpfulness standard
of evidence law by serving as a check on the court's own ethical intuition.
Nonetheless, a number of problems potentially undermine the school's
usefulness as a source of normative testimony. The first difficulty is in-
tuitionism's lack of coherence as an ethical system. Most intuitionists arrive
at similar results, but the intermediate data from which they derive those
results are unsettlingly diverse-rational self-interest, psychological princi-
ples of ego-satisfaction, fellow-feeling, knowledge of the Good. 19 Some
deontological intuitionists, moreover, are inattentive to relevant factual evi-
dence, further reducing the helpfulness of testimony they might offer.
196
The views of some intuitionists would not map onto legal roles and modes
of operation because they leave little scope for expertise. Clarke and Butler,
for example, believed that the moral sense which all persons possess oper-
ates unerringly. 197 In this view, an expert's testimony would be of little value
to the court other than as proof that what the judge or jury's conscience
indicates about the morality of certain conduct is, in fact, correct. This, of
course, would be metaethical, rather than normative ethical testimony.
Not all intuitionists, however, would reject the possibility of normative
ethical expertise. Locke, for example, maintained that fundamental princi-
ples-the duty to keep promises, to aid others, to control and direct the
upbringing of one's children, and the right to the fruit of one's labor, for
example-are "intelligible and plain to any rational being who will con-
template the relations of men ... to each other and to God."' 198 Locke also
believed that moral ideas are not innate; they do not "offer themselves to
[our] view without searching."' 19 9 Thus, while every person has the ability to
"I See J. BUTLER, Sermon 1, in FIVE SERMONS BY JOSEPH BUTLER 20, 20-23 (Little
Library of Liberal Arts ed. 1950).
195 See supra notes 185 (knowledge of the Good), 188 (psychological egoism) &
192 (fellow-feeling) and accompanying text.
196 Kant, for example, held that ethical duties are absolute. "The law concerning
punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe unto him who rummages around in
the winding paths of a theory of happiness looking for some advantage to be gained
by releasing the criminal from punishment or reducing the amount of it .... "
I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (J. Ladd trans. 1965) (lst
ed. K6nigsberg 1797); see also Maclntyre, supra note 22, at 196 ("Kant argues that
my duty is my duty irrespective of the consequences.").
197 See J. BUTLER, supra note 194, at 22-23; Sprague, supra note 192, at 432-34
(views of Butler); Sprague, supra note 187, at 118-20 (views of Clark).
'1 See H. SIDGWICK, supra note 186, at 177-78.
199 1 J. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. 1, ch. 11, § 1,
at 65 (A. Fraser ed. 1894) (1st ed. London 1690). In his commentary on this passage,
Fraser quotes a letter from Molyneux to Locke, August, 1692:
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discern the way to happiness and the good life, 20 0 not everyone uses that
ability properly. Furthermore, careful use of moral reason to draw correct
conclusions from self-evident fundamental principles may require not
merely a few minutes, but rather days, weeks, months, or years. Under this
interpretation, complex and difficult deduction may be necessary when the
matter for decision goes beyond the fundamental principles of morality, and
only the expert can provide such analysis.20 1
Yet Locke's view would present problems of its own. These do not
concern the ability of intuitionists to testify consistently with their own
notions of the source and derivation of morality, so much as the judicial
system's difficulty with evaluating and using their contribution. It is difficult
to cross-examine or rebut an intuition, especially when the witness takes the
view that those who do not share it are simply benighted or persons "whose
reason has been either clouded by education or bad habits or overborne by
selfish desires. ' 20 2 In a trial setting, moral testimony is useless unless
supported by reasons and open to analysis and criticism. 20 3 Hence, the
inexact match between intuitionist ethics and the adversary system of ad-
judication could lead many courts to reject it completely as a source of
normative testimony.
4. Moral Stages and Development
The view that persons are naturally equipped to discover moral truths
suggests another area of possible inquiry-the development, from birth to
adulthood, of the faculties that operate in the process of drawing normative
conclusions. Inspired by the work of Piaget on intellectual and moral devel-
opment of children,2 0 4 Lawrence Kohlberg 0 5 and others have recently
One thing I must needs insist on to you, which is, that you would think of
obliging the world with a Treatise on Morals, drawn up according to the hints
you frequently give in your Essay of their being demonstrable according to
mathematical method. This is most certainly true; but then the task must be
undertaken only by so clear and distinct a thinker as you are, and there is nothing
I should more ardently wish for than to see it.
Id. n.2. Locke never undertook the task, explaining in reply to Molyneux that "I saw
that morality might be demonstratively made out, yet whether I am able so to make it
out is another question. Every one could not have demonstrated what Mr. Newton's
book hath shown to be demonstrable." Id.
200 See id., bk. 11, ch. XXI, § 72.
201 The idea of morality as a complex deductive system like Newtonian physics
suggests that a moral expert would perform a function similar to that of a metallurgist
explaining the significance of evidence relating to automobile parts. See Wylie v.
Ford Motor Co., 502 F.2d 1292, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 1974).
202 Sprague, supra note 187, at 119.
201 See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text; infra note 253 and accompany-
ing text (reasoned-analysis requirement for expert moral testimony).
204 E.g., B. INHELDER & J. PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM
CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE (1958): J. PIAGET, MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD
(1932): J. PIAGET, THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN (1952).
205 Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientation Toward a Moral Order,
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attempted to explain the development of moral consciousness in precisely
these terms.2 0 6 Kohlberg identifies five stages of moral development, which
he classifies into three levels-preconventional, conventional, and princi-
pled. 20 7 The stages range from simple obedience to rules at level one to an
"internal commitment to principles of conscience [and a] respect for the
rights, life and dignity of all persons," based on an awareness that "[p]ar-
ticular moral/social rules are social contracts, arrived at through democratic
reconciliation of differing viewpoints and open to change." 2 08 A related view
identifies moral development in group rather than individual terms, and
equates normative worth or goodness with evolutionary fitness. 20 9 Such
"social Darwinism" today may be giving way to E.O. Wilson's sociobiol-
ogy, 210 which equates human ethical behavior with the propensity to per-
petuate one's genetic heritage.
2 11
Proponents of moral-stage ethics will have, at most, a limited scope for
testimony under current evidence law. It is tempting to think that those
adults-according to Kohlberg's findings, about 25 percent of the
population-who have advanced to the highest stage of ethical development
possess a type of expertise that courts should recognize through admission
of their testimony on ethical questions. 21 2 Yet Kohlberg offers no justifica-
in 6 VITA HUMANA 11 (1963) [hereinafter cited as "Kohlberg, Children's Develop-
ment"]. Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Development
Approach, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH AND
SOCIAL ISSUES 39 (T. Lickona ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as "Kohlberg, Moral
Stages"]; Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Development Approach to
Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL THEORY AND RESEARCH, ch. 6 (D. Goslin
ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as "Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence"]; see also J. RAWLS,
supra note 1, § 46 (development of moral sense).
206 For a general discussion of this movement, see Lickona, How to Encourage
Moral Development, in ANNUAL EDITIONS READINGS IN EDUCATION 89, 89-93
(instructor's copy F. Schutz ed. 1978).
207 Kohlberg developed his theory by analyzing the responses of many subjects,
aged 10, 13, and 16 at the outset of the study, to a number of moral dilemmas over a
long period. The study, which began in 1958, was still in progress in 1980. See
H. ,ROSEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOMORAL KNOWLEDGE 68-69 (1980) (de-
scribing Kohlberg's study).
20 Lickona, supra note 206, at 90. Lickona asserts that the practical value of
Kohlberg's moral stages thesis is its definition of "a natural, non-relativistic good for
moral education: progress through the developmental stages." Id. at 91.
209 See generally Flew, Evolutionary Ethics, in NEW STUDIES IN ETHICS 31
(A. Flew ed. 1967).
2 10 E. 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS (1975).
211 Ethics is thus "biologized"-goodness is that which promotes genetic surviv-
al. Mattern, Altruism, Ethics, and Sociobiology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY DEBATE 462
(Caplan ed. 1978).
212 Moral stages theories have a metaethical analogue in "ideal observer" theo-
ries. Mentioned as long ago as 1759 by Adam Smith, see Smith, The Theory of Moral
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tion in his work for the assertion that "more mature" and "better" are
synonymous.213 Similarly, Wilson does not-and, perhaps, cannot 2 4-sub-
stantiate the view that behavior that promotes genetic survival is, on that
account, good. The insights of these authors, therefore, describe only what
certain persons believe rather than what they should believe. Accordingly, a
court might find their testimony helpful on matters of descriptive ethics but
of little value on normative or metaethical questions.
5. Religious Ethics
To many, morality and religious doctrine are closely linked. Thus, courts
in search of advice on ethical matters might naturally turn to religious
Sentiments, in I BRITISH MORALISTS 257, 257-77 (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1897), ideal
observer theories hold that -X is right" means "an ideal observer would be disposed
to approve of X." Although the apparent circularity of such theories has prevented
their wide acceptance as accounts of normative ethics, recent efforts, such as that of
Roderick Firth, are instructive for the light they shed on the problem of selecting and
qualifying moral experts. See Firth, Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer, in
READINGS IN ETHICAL THEORY 200 (W. Sellars & J. Hospers eds. 1970); see also
Kneale, Objectivity in Morals, 25 PHIL. 149 (1950) (discussing the difference between
morality and the law according to both objective and subjective philosophers). The
ideal observer, Firth says, is omniscient with respect to nonethical facts, id. at 212,
omnipercipient and able to visualize all actual facts as vividly as if he were actually
perceiving them, id. at 213-14, disinterested, id. at 214, dispassionate, id. at 217,
consistent, id. at 218, and normal in other respects, id. at 220.
An intriguing aspect of Firth's criteria is that they closely track existing rules and
practices concerning the selection of, and presentation of factual information to,
judges and jurors. In theory, then, the ideal observer approach is a strong endorse-
ment of the position that courts do not need moral experts because they are already
as well-equipped as possible to resolve moral dilemmas. Yet Firth's view would still
permit the use of moralists to make up for deficiencies in judges or jurors with respect
to sensitivity, imagination, intellectual power, or practice at bringing those faculties
into play in making moral judgments.
213 At most, findings such as Kohlberg's indicate that individuals tend statistically
to give different responses to moral dilemmas as they become older. Yet any of a
number of factors, including socialization, indoctrination, moral growth or deterio-
ration may explain the fact and direction of the change. There is no reason to suppose
at the outset that answers given by older people in a particular social, political, and
economic setting are morally better than answers provided by the young. See ALA.
CODE § 16-40-3(c) (1977), which provides that instruction in the public schools:
shall emphasize the free-enterprise-competitive economy of the United States of
America as the one which produces higher wages, higher standards of living,
greater personal freedom and liberty than any other system of economics on
earth. It shall lay particular emphasis upon the dangers of communism, the ways
to fight communism, the evils of communism, the fallacies of communism and
the false doctrines of communism.
214 G. MOORE, supra note 18, at 9-21 ("naturalist fallacy" of attempting to derive
"ought" statements from "is" statements).
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figures-priests, rabbis, ministers-as sources of normative expertise. This
practice raises difficulties not implicated by secular moralists, but nonethe-
less sheds light on the relationship between evidence law and moral philoso-
phy. Because analysis is relatively easy in the case of Catholic orthodoxy,
our brief examination is limited to that narrow field, 215 and within that field
to a single central authority-Aquinas.
21 6
Aquinas held that men and women generally would act morally if they
undertook a reasoned pursuit of their natural inclinations. 217 This is so partly
because all persons possess an inclination toward "universal goods, such as
consideration of the interests of other persons and the avoidance of igno-
rance," as well as inclinations toward self-preservation, physical well-being,
sexual reproduction, and the care of offspring. 218 In choosing appropriate
means in the pursuit of these ends, "the proximate rule is the human reason,
the supreme rule is the Eternal Law."1
219
The "Eternal Law" thus guides moral action. 220 It is known to in some
215 It is difficult to generalize about Protestant and Jewish views of morals. Unlike
Catholicism, with its hierarchical organization and strongly centralized traditions, the
theology and morals of the Protestant and Jewish worlds are too fragmented to permit
group treatment. Some Protestant and Jewish moralists approach ethics deontologi-
cally, emphasizing duty and conformity to Scriptural authority, see, e.g., J. CALVIN,
CHRISTIAN FAITH, supra note 170; J. CALVIN, SERMONS, supra note 170; J. KNOX,
supra note 170, while others allow wide scope for conscience and personal decision-
making, and emphasize the need to balance conflicting sources of moral obligation,
see, e.g., D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS (1955); M. BUBER, supra note 170; S. KIER-
KEGAARD, EITHER-OR, supra note 149; S. KIERKEGAARD, SICKNESS UNTO DEATH,
supra note 149. Still others seem to fit more squarely within the utilitarian tradition of
Western moral thought. See, e.g., R. NIEBUHR, INTERPRETATION, supra note 170;
R. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 170.
216 The views of St. Thomas Aquinas on the nature of morality and moral truth are
significant because of the great respect accorded his teachings by the Catholic
Church. Although Aquinas is not the source of infallible doctrine that the Pope is, see
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. IV, ch. 76 (C. O'Neil trans.
Notre Dame 1975) (first published under the title On the Truth of the Catholic Faith,
Hanover House, 1957) (1st ed. 1264) (supremacy and infallibility of the Pope); see
also Bourke, St. Thomas Aquinas, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 105, 113-14
(P. Edwards ed. 1967), his thought is nonetheless an indication of the trend of
Catholic theology on any given point.
217 Aquinas' views on morality are complex. See generally Bourke, supra note
216, at 105. Their essentials, however, so far as they concern us here, may be stated
as follows: Right action is action which tends toward a good end. The good end for
man is happiness or well-being, which comes from reasoned pursuit of natural
inclinations. Id. at 112.
218 Id. at 112.
219 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, la2ae, q. 21, art. 1 (The Domini-
can Fathers trans. 1964-66) (1st ed. 1265-72).
220 Aquinas held that an individual should go about the pursuit of his or her natural
inclinations in as rational a way as he or she can, "keeping in mind the kind of agent
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degree, because a "knowledge of [it] is imprinted [upon] us by God." '2 21 Yet
this knowledge does not include perfect comprehension,2 2 2 and some of the
ends that constitute the good are only dimly and imperfectly known. 223 For
these reasons, some elements of Eternal Law are made available as Divine
Law-the law revealed in Scripture and interpreted by the Church.
22 4
Aquinas holds that Divine Law is often a better guide for moral conduct than
natural inclinations and intellect as aided by Eternal Law, and thus con-
cludes we should follow it in every precept it lays down.
22 5
At one level, Aquinas' metaethical. view leaves a broad scope for the
operation of moral expertise. For example, a religious ethicist or theologian
might usefully assist the court with the metaethical functions of moral
reasoning and explication of concepts, or with the provision of descriptive
testimony. In addition, a person who has studied scripture carefully and who
is well-versed in the Church's interpretation of that scripture will be able to
apply the interpretations authoritatively on a variety of normative questions.
Most major religious systems would meet the requirements of consistency,
completeness, respect for reason and facts, and consonance with society's
notion of right and wrong, and would seem to map onto judicial functions,
since most religionists are neither skeptics who would approach the court-
room with a sense of hopelessness, nor situation-bound intuitionists unable
to justify their testimony with reasons and principles.
2 26
There is, however, one major obstacle which might preclude resort to reli-
gious ethicists: the Establishment Clause of the first amendment. The first
amendment bars governmental action "respecting an establishment of reli-
gion." ' 227 The Establishment Clause concerns both potential and actual
fusion of church and state, 228 and requires that states remain neutral and
that he is and the position that he occupies in the total scheme of reality." Bourke,
supra note 216, at 112. The Eternal Law, however, always takes precedence in case
of any conflict, and is always available in case of uncertainty.
221 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 219, la2ae, q. 93, art. 2 (citing Augustine,
De lib. arbit. 1, VI, reprinted in 6 AUGUSTINE: EARLIER WRITINGS 102, 121
(J. Burleigh trans. 1953)); cf. supra notes 185-94 and accompanying text (ethical
intuitionism).
222 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 219, la2ae, q. 93, art. 2.
223 Id. q. 91, art. 4.
224 See id.
225 Id. arts. 4-5.
26 Some religionists, however, might decline to testify on the ground that the
judge and jurors can draw their own moral conclusions without the aid of an expert
through reflection on their own natural inclinations, study of scripture, and resort to
conscience.
227 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The Establishment Clause applies to the states as well
as to the federal government. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
228 Lemon v. Kurtzman,.403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (Establishment Clause was
intended to afford protection against three main evils: " 'sponsorship, financial
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noninvolved with respect to religious matters. 229 In scrutinizing laws under
the clause, courts generally require that governmental action have a secular
purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and
avoid excessive entanglement with religion.
230
A court seeking to justify the use of religious moralists would first need to
establish that neither the purpose nor primary effect of such testimony is
advancement of religion. In many cases, these requirements could be easily
satisfied-the purpose of the testimony is to render a decision in accord with
morality and sound social policy; the primary effect is the wise resolution of
a secular moral question. Of course, one might respond that religious figures
on the witness stand may so effectively sway jurors that they will merely
adopt the expert's religiously-based view, thereby institutionalizing religious
beliefs.231 Yet cases upholding various abortion and Sunday closing laws
against charges of undue religious influence on legislatures support the view
that hearing from religionists is not necessarily synonymous with instituting
a particular sect's precepts. 23 2 So long as the expert's testimony is secular in
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.' ") (citing
Walz v. Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
229 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1953).
Of course, courts generally reject religious belief or disbelief as a requirement for
giving testimony, see FED. R. EVID. 601; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 63, and as
grounds for impeachment, see FED. R. EVID. 610; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6,
§ 48; cf. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Peterson, 553 F.2d 324, 329 (3d Cir.
1977) (evidence of religious belief inadmissible to enhance credibility of witness).
230 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13. See generally J. NOWAK,
P. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 852-71 (1978).
231 Similarly, to the extent qualification depends on the sect's consonance with
norms and values incorporated in law, see supra note 140 and accompanying text, the
court might impermissibly "prefer one religion over another" in determining who is
qualified to testify. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); cf. Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 491, 495 (1961) (statute requiring an oath professing belief in
God violates the first amendment; states may not force persons "to profess belief or
disbelief in any religion," or favor theistic religions over nontheistic religions and
nonbelievers).
232 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (upholding the Hyde
Amendment's limitations on the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abor-
tions under the Medicare program; that legislation happens to coincide with religious
tenets does not violate the first amendment); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
442, 452 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws); Womens Servs., P.C. v. Thorne,
483 F. Supp. 1022, 1032-40, 1037 & n.14 (D. Neb. 1979) (upholding an abortion law
sponsored by a group "embracing the 'pro-life philosophy' " and passed after legis-
lators had heard the views of "expert[s] in religion"), aff'd per curiam, 636 F.2d 206,
209 (8th Cir. 1980). In these cases, the courts noted that coincidence of religious
views and secular legislation did not contravene the Establishment Clause, for such a
standard would stifle the public expression of religious groups and necessitate invali-
dation of many laws, including prohibitions against murder and incest. But cf.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking a statute forbidding the teaching
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nature, one might contend, any enhancement of the expert's sect is merely
incidental.
In practice, however, moralists trained in religious disciplines may be
unable to separate secular views and religous doctrine, thus raising entan-
glement problems. 23 3 Assume, for example, that a parent in a child custody
dispute introduced testimony by a priest concerning the moral unfitness of
the other parent, an avowed homosexual. Assume further that cross-
examination revealed that the priest's recommendation rested squarely upon
biblical interpretation.2 3 4 The homosexual parent might then seek to respond
by introducing a minister from another denomination to testify that the
passage relied on by the priest incorrectly states Divine Law, or that the
priest misapplied it to the child custody context. To the extent that a court
gave weight to one of these views in deciding the case, it would seem to be
taking sides in a religious dispute 235 and thus violating the first amend-
ment.
236
In cases of this nature, courts might assess constitutional objections
within the framework proposed by Professor Jane Friedman. 237 Professor
Friedman's test attempts to set workable limits for legislation in areas in
which moral and religious motivations interpenetrate. It requires that states
not place their authority "behind a moral precept ... not buttressed by any
societal consensus, but . . . the subject of widespread controversy and
debate .... ,,238 Further, the action must not force nonadherents "to shape
of evolution theories on grounds of no secular purpose or effect); Grendel's Den, Inc.
v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1981) (statute permitting churches to veto certain
liquor license application has impermissible effect of advancing religion), aff'd sub
nom. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 51 U.S.L.W. 4025 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1982).
233 The nonentanglement requirement reflects a "desire to preserve the autonomy
and self-government of religious organizations" as well as "a conviction that gov-
ernment must never take sides in religious matters." L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 871.
234 See I Corinthians 6:9-10 ("Do not be deceived; neither the immoral, nor...
homosexuals . . . will inherit the kingdom of God.").
235 See supra.note 233.
236 Courts considering entanglement issues often emphasize the history of the
church-state relationship in question, and are more willing to uphold long-established
practices since upholding them appears neutral. See Bogen v. Doty, 598 F.2d 1110,
1114 (8th Cir. 1979) (upholding prayers by clergy at public meetings). But see
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1978) (Tennessee's prohibition against
ministers or priests serving as representatives at limited constitutional conventions
violates the Free Exercise Clause; state failed to show that historical fears of
church-state entanglement remain compelling); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 16-18 (1947) (emphasizing the importance of appearance of neutrality). Thus, that
courts have not regularly invoked the aid of religious ethicists might further an
entanglement claim.
237 Friedman, The Federal Fetal Experimentation Regulations: An Establishment
Clause Analysis, 61 MINN. L. REv. 961, 976-85 (1977).
238 Id. at 977.
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their behavior in accordance with the beliefs of adherents," and must not
result from a "debate . . . waged in religious terms . . . [nor from] strong
religious pressures." 23 9 Under this standard, testimony from religiously
trained ethicists is permissible only in cases requiring a choice among rules
of decision which are supported by a respectable body of secular opinion.
When this condition is not met, or when it is met but there is a likelihood that
allowing the religious moralist to testify would foster a contest in the court-
room among competing religious doctrines, the court should exclude the
testimony. Moreover, whenever an adverse party ferrets out a sectarian
basis for the expert's testimony through cross-examination, the court should
order the testimony stricken from the record. Thus, although courts need not
establish a per se prohibition against the use of religious moralists, the
practical incidence of such testimony may be severely limited by first
amendment concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts of law have permitted expert moralists to perform functions rang-
ing from description of community mores, to metaethical analysis of terms
and modes of argument, to substantive resolution of normative problems. In
the past, this has occurred with little controversy and little recognition that
such testimony might present unique problems not presented by more famil-
iar types of expert testimony. It seems likely, moreover, that resort to expert
ethicists and moralists will increase as advancing technology, especially in
the medical and biomedical sciences, poses human problems never encoun-
tered before. 240 Further acceleration may come from the increased readiness
of other branches of government to assign major roles in ethical decision-
making to individuals and groups believed to be expert at moral and policy
analysis 24 1 and from the general trend of courts and attorneys in favoring
expert testimony of all sorts under the helpfulness standard. 242 Thus, careful
examination of the issues posed by expert ethical testimony is essential.
Based on the analysis undertaken in this Article, the results appear
mixed-certain types of ethical testimony are far more problematic than
others. For example, the law of evidence poses little obstacle to any type of
descriptive testimony on questions concerning the morality or immorality of
acts or policies according to specified ethical systems, the morality or im-
239 Id.
240 See cases cited at supra note 10; see also Maclntyre, supra note 22, at 16-17
(society's need for ethical guidance presently at one of three historical peaks),
Yesley, supra note 1, at 5 (ethics advisory boards in areas of biomedical and
behavioral science now permanent institutions in the federal government).
241 See supra note 14 (use of moralists and ethicists in advisory commissions and
as advisors to legislative committees).
242 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 546(62), at
265 (1964 & Supp. 1980).
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morality of acts or policies according to most or all moral systems, or the
morality or immorality according to contemporary standards in given com-
munities. 243 Expert analysis also may reveal lack of agreement among moral
systems about particular questions, leaving the court free to draw its own
conclusions. Similarly, metaethical functions such as assisting the court with
respect to moral reasoning or analysis seem relatively uncontroversial.
The case is much closer, however, with respect to the ethicist's normative
functions-declaring certain actions or rules right or wrong absolutely or
determining that one individual rather than another ought to be entrusted
with making a moral decision. Review of leading schools of ethical and
metaethical thought suggests that expert witnesses drawn from their ranks
could serve as acceptable witnesses. Although these various ethical schools
analyze moral problems differently, and at times come to disparate conclu-
sions,2 44 lack of unanimity need not pose an insurmountable barrier. After
all, courts continue to find expert testimony from warring schools of psychi-
atry, medicine, and art criticism helpful.2 45 Yet disagreement on moral
questions may exceed that found in other areas, and for that reason, a court
might well exclude normative testimony on "state of the art" grounds.
2 46
Courts might also disagree on the manner and extent to which ethical
experts can transmit advice to nonexperts. A number of highly regarded
243 In each of these examples, the expert merely reports a correspondence be-
tween acts and norms in a case in which the law makes this relevant.
244 Compare supra note 145 and accompanying text (Sophists' view that goodness
is equivalent to enlightened self-interest), with supra notes 217-24 and accompanying
text (Aquinas' position that rightness consists of promoting certain universal goods,
as guided by conscience and scripture) and supra notes 166-82 and accompanying
text (deontological view that right conduct consists in following the path of duty).
241 See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 64 Cal. App.
2d 162, 166-67, 148 P.2d 95, 97 (1944) (expert testimony sufficient to support Com-
mission's finding despite conflict with other expert testimony); Sanborn v. Elmore
Milling Co., 152 Me. 355, 359, 129 A.2d 556, 558 (1957) (conflicting expert testimony
regarding the cause of death of certain turkeys considered by jury with all other
relevant evidence); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 18 at 40 n.31 (psychiatric experts
may be "dynamically" or "organically" oriented).
246 Compare Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("Just
when a scientific principle . . . crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the eviden-
tial force of the principle must be recognized ... [as] sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs."), with MacIn-
tyre, supra note 22, at 17 (ethical schools proceed from different premises and are
hence "incommensurable," citing diametrically opposed premises and conclusions
of Rawls and Nozick).
One of the authors of this Article believes that on matters of normative ethics,
speculation and conjecture set in at approximately the point where general consensus
among ordinary persons leaves off. Expert normative testimony would be useful only
up to this point, although experts may still be able to assist on matters of descriptive
ethics and metaethics.
MORALIST AS EXPERT WITNESS
moral philosophers believe that normative truths exist objectively and that
individuals who are able to discern them may help others do so. 247 Experts
who hold these views are likely to welcome the opportunity to testify in
court, and to have no objection to the testimony of others. 248 Other equally
renowned moral philosophers, however, hold that normative truths are not
transmissible under circumstances approximating those found in a typical
courtroom.2 49 Still others view moral truths as linked with religious doctrine
and training in a way that poses problems of church-state entanglement. What
standard then, should guide the courts?
Mindful of problems inherent in this area, we propose that courts permit
expert moral testimony on questions of normative ethics when the expert's
testimony satisfies the proposed three-part test, when the other side is free to
introduce experts of its own, and when no strong countervailing reason
militates against such testimony. 250 Under these criteria, the testimony of
the clergyman in Hart appears to have been proper. 251 The issue confronting
the court was one of morals or policy.2 52 No existing case law guided the
judge's discretion. The witness had training in moral philosophy and his
testimony promised to prove helpful to the court in resolving the dilemma
before it. Moreover, he apparently testified on nonreligious grounds and had
it wished, the opposing party could have cross-examined the witness and
introduced experts of its own. 2 3
247 See supra notes 166-76, 185 and accompanying text (views of various de-
ontologists).
248 See supra notes 182-83, 185 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 148, 202-03 and accompanying text (views of Socratic skeptics
and moral intuitionists); cf. Burch, Are There Moral Experts?, 58 MONIST 646 (1974).
Burch defends the idea that there are "moral experts"-but not in the legal sense-
against various schools of moral skepticism. He analyzes the "repulsive" quality of
this view, concluding that the repulsiveness arises from the mistaken tendency to see
the expert as "some sort of arrogant philosopher-king, a king of Mustapha Mond and
Grand Inquisitor rolled into one." Id. at 658. Instead of issuing imperious edicts,
Burch's moral experts would transmit their expertise indirectly by example, as
"figures like Confucius' 'superior man,' Christianity's 'saint,' or Philosophy's 'wise
man.' " Id. Moral expertise, therefore, would not be an exotic quality possessed by a
favored few, but a quality that "ordinary men striving to live a morally better life
[may] keep before their minds as the moral ideal." Id. Unfortunately, Burch never
addresses the problem of how we can tell when we have before us one of these
exemplars.
250 See supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text (discussing potential invasion of
the judge's or jury's province).
251 See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
252 A rule permitting operations under these circumstances keeps the donee alive
at relatively little cost to the donor. On the other hand, it treats the incompetent
minor donor as an organ bank for the benefit of the relative.
253 See Dworkin, supra note 1, at 994-1004 (legal norms, to be defensible, must be
supported by reasons; otherwise laws are indistinguishable from quirks, preferences,
1982]
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In summary, qualification and examination of an expert introduced to
testify on a question of normative ethics should center around the following
questions: (1) Does the witness derive conclusions from sources other than
religious doctrine?; (2) Is the testimony impartial?; (3) Are the witness'
recommendations "considered," and supported by adequate reasons?; (4)
Does the witness' testimony promise to illuminate the issue at hand and
help the judge or jury decide?; and (5) Are the expert's moral views consis-
tent with the considered moral judgments of thoughtful members of our
society? Negative answers to many of these questions should lead a court to
exclude the testimony, while positive answers to all of them would suggest
admission. In either case, merely phrasing the inquiry in such terms should
lead to more explicit recognition of the importance of ethical analysis in legal
decisionmaking.
and prejudices, and are inadequate bases for regulating human conduct in a free
society).
Other cases of normative ethical testimony would not fare so well. For example,
although moralists might offer metaethical testimony that reasons underlying acts of
civil disobedience are religious and moral in nature, see Font v. Laird, 318 F. Supp.
891, 893 (D. Md. 1970), they should not be permitted to demonstrate that those acts
are in fact, moral, by reciting Scripture. Such testimony would likely violate the first
amendment prohibition against religious testimony. Cf. Rachels, supra note 22, at 40
(arguing that theologians are most helpful "when they are least theological").
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